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Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments
Kenneth Rigby'
I. MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENTS
The important distinction between a matrimonial agreement
and other types of interspousal contracts continues to elude some
attorneys and courts.
In Vogt v. Vogt, a former wife filed an action styled "Rule to
Show Cause To Enforce Support Provisions of Matrimonial
Agreement."' The agreement was executed prior to marriage and
stated that the parties elected to be governed by Louisiana
2
community property law. It contained provisions stipulating the
amount of alimony that the husband would pay to the wife in the
event of divorce, provided that she had not committed adultery, as
well as the husband's obligation to maintain a life insurance policy
in her favor as long as the alimony obligation existed.3 The former
husband contended that the agreement was not a valid matrimonial
agreement under Louisiana Civil Code article 2328.4 The court
correctly held that the agreement was an antenuptial contract not
contemplated by that article.5 It also correctly held that, although
the document was titled "Matrimonial Agreement," the title affixed
to a document does not, of itself, control its character (which,
instead, is determined by examining the entire writing).6 The court
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4. Id. at 431. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2328 (2006) (defining matrimonial
agreement).
5. Vogt, 831 So. 2d at 432.
6. Id.
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then added, "However, it is a matrimonial agreement permitted
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329."
7
The agreement was not a matrimonial agreement at all. A
matrimonial agreement is a contract establishing a regime of
separation of property or modifying or terminating the legal
regime.8 This agreement did none of those things. Alimony is not
a rule of any type of matrimonial regime, whether a legal regime, a
separation of property regime, a contractual regime, or a regime
that is partly legal and partly contractual. 9 The agreement did not
change or otherwise affect the legal regime that was to exist
between the parties during their marriage. Particularly egregious is
the suggestion that there are two types of matrimonial agreements,
one permitted by Louisiana Civil Code article 2328 and the other
by article 2329. There is only one type of interspousal contract
that is classified as a matrimonial agreement, and it is defined in
article 2328. Article 2329 does not create a different type of
matrimonial agreement. It defines the permitted limits on the
objects of a matrimonial agreement and the form requirements for
a matrimonial agreement if confected during the marriage of the
parties. The matrimonial agreement referred to in article 2329 is
the one defined in article 2328.
Two Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decisions
correctly distinguished between a matrimonial agreement and other
types of interspousal contracts.' 0 In Pelafigue v. Sudduth, the court
correctly held that an agreement entered into during marriage for
the building of a house, which provided for the contributions of
money and labor for its construction and its disposition upon
divorce of the parties, was not a matrimonial agreement." The
contract, although dealing with an asset to be acquired in the
future, concerned only the construction of a house, options granted
to the parties to purchase the house upon its completion, and its
7. Id. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006) (defining instances of
modification and exclusion of the matrimonial regime).
8. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2328 (2006).
9. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2326 (2006).
10. Guidry v. Guidry, 830 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002); Pelafigue v.




valuation, and not the classification of that asset.12 Thus, it did not
modify any of the rules of a legal regime. Hence, the agreement
was not a matrimonial agreement requiring dual judicial findings
under article 2329 for its validity.'3
In Guidry v. Guidry, an attorney and his wife entered into a
"Shareholders Agreement" and a "Subscription Agreement" with a
law firm in which the husband was to become a shareholder.' 4 The
agreements fixed the value of the shares of stock to be issued to the
husband, in the event of a divorce between the parties, and the wife
signed the agreements. 15 In the subsequent divorce proceedings,
the wife contended that these agreements were matrimonial
agreements and that they were void for non-compliance with
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329, and the trial court held the
agreements to be matrimonial agreements subject to the dual
judicial findings requirements of that article. 16  Reversing, the
appellate court held that the agreements were not matrimonial
agreements because they did not alter the classification of the
shares of stock to be acquired by the husband as community
property, but simply set forth a procedure to be followed and a
method of evaluation of community stock in the event of a
divorce. 17 The analysis and decision are correct.
A previous third circuit case, Boudreaux v. Boudreaux,
incorrectly held that an agreement between spouses entered into
during a pending divorce suit that provided that the wife could live
in the family home as long as she remained single and which
provided for contingencies of remarriage, etc., was a matrimonial
agreement subject to the Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 dual
judicial findings requirement. 8  Neither Pelafigue nor Guidry
mentions Boudreaux.
The failure to distinguish between a matrimonial agreement
and other types of interspousal agreements probably is the result of
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 830 So. 2d at 570-71.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 571.
17. Id. at 572.
18. See 745 So. 2d 61, 64 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 748 So. 2d 1165
(La. 1999).
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not understanding the restrictive nature of a matrimonial
agreement. In one of the few commentaries that have defined
"matrimonial agreement," Professors Spaht and Hargrave explain:
"[A matrimonial agreement] is the kind of agreement that affects
the classification and management of future acquisitions that are
unique to the matrimonial agreements. Matrimonial agreements
'contemplate an ongoing regulation of property as it comes into
existence."' 19
Not all agreements between spouses affecting future property
are matrimonial agreements, however. As Professors Spaht and
Hargrave carefully point out, it is only an agreement which affects
"the classification and management of future acquisitions" that is a
matrimonial agreement. Although an agreement may have as its
object future acquisitions, unless the agreement affects the
classification or management of that future property, it is not a
matrimonial agreement.
The writer has defined a matrimonial agreement as follows:
All agreements entered into between married persons are
not matrimonial agreements. The latter are a particular
type of agreement, defined by the subject matter [object] of
the agreement.
The basic characteristic that distinguishes a matrimonial
agreement from other types of contracts entered into
between spouses or between persons contemplating
marriage is that a matrimonial agreement contracts with
reference to the property regime that exists or will exist
between them during the marriage. A property regime is a
system of principles and rules that govern the ownership
and management of the property of spouses during
marriage, both as between themselves and towards third
persons.
The object of a matrimonial agreement is these governing
principles and rules. If the agreement modifies any of the
19. Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 9.5,
in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 582 n.33 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). See also Neal Joseph Darce, Interspousal Contracts, 42 LA.
L. REv. 727 (1982).
20. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 19, at § 8.6, at 527.
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principles or rules of a particular regime, or one system of
principles or rules is substituted for another (one regime for
another) in whole or in part, the agreement is a matrimonial
agreement. Spouses are at liberty, however, to enter into a
myriad of other contracts or agreements between
themselves before or during marriage which are not
matrimonial agreements. For convenience, those
agreements between spouses that are not matrimonial
agreements have been denominated as "interspousal
contracts." These types of contracts between spouses have
no special form, court approval, or recordation
requirements, as do matrimonial agreements. They are
subject only to the general rules governing the proof of
obligations and the special rules regulating the proof of
some particular types of obligations.21
When spouses contract with respect to presently owned
community property, they do not modify any of the governing
rules and principles of the legal regime classifying property as
community or separate.22 In the legal regime, property is classified
as community or separate property (or partially community and
partially separate in the case of incorporeal movables) at the
moment of acquisition by application of the rules and principles
governing the legal regime. Likewise, if the spouses contract
with reference to future property in a manner that does not affect
any of the classification rules, the management rules, the
reimbursement rules, and other rules of their matrimonial regime,
that agreement is not a matrimonial agreement.
24
21. Kenneth Rigby, The 1997 Spousal Support Act, 58 LA. L. REv. 887,
937-39 (1998) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Rigby, 1997 Spousal Support
Act]. See also Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 60
LA. L. REv. 405, 442-45 (2000) [hereinafter Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes].
22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2338-44 (2006).
23. Noil v. Noil, 699 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Smith v.
Smith, 685 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Succession of Adger, 457
So. 2d 146, 149 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
24. Although most of the cases raising the issue of whether an interspousal
agreement is a matrimonial agreement involve the classification of assets rules,
the same analysis applies to an agreement that changes the management rules,
2006]
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Spouses may agree between themselves on the classification of
a particular item of property at the time of its acquisition.25 The
26spouses may also change the classification after its acquisition.
Neither act is a matrimonial agreement, as neither terminates the
legal regime nor modifies any of the rules of their matrimonial
regime.
The failure to distinguish between a matrimonial agreement
and other types of interspousal contracts can have significant
consequences. Matrimonial agreements, whether executed prior to
marriage or during marriage, have special requirements not
applicable to other types of interspousal contracts, and failure to
observe these requirements may result in the matrimonial
agreement being a nullity.
27
Whenever executed, a matrimonial agreement must be by
authentic act or by an act under private signature duly
acknowledged by both of the spouses; a pre-marital matrimonial
agreement under private signature establishing a separation of
property regime for the marriage is not valid.28 In Ritz v. Ritz, the
the classification of obligations rules, or the reimbursement rules of the legal
regime. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2335 et seq. (2006).
Similarly, any interspousal contract changing the rules of the separation of
property regime or of a contractual regime or a regime that is partly legal and
partly contractual is a matrimonial agreement requiring compliance with articles
2329 and 2331. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2326-28, 2370-73 (2006).
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2342 (2006); Bionda v. Bionda, 769 So. 2d 94,
100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000); Gautreau v. Gautreau, 697 So. 2d 1339, 1350-51
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 703 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1997). Although the result
of compliance with article 2342 is generally treated as classifying the property
as separate property of the acquiring spouse, the result might be more properly
characterized as one of estoppel by deed, one of three types of estoppel
recognized by the jurisprudence. Harper v. Leonard, 6 So. 2d 326, 333 (La.
1942). The forced heirs and creditors of the spouses may controvert the
declaration of the acquiring spouse, despite the concurrence by the other spouse.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2342 (2006). Only the concurring spouse is barred
from controverting the declaration of the acquiring spouse. Id.
26. Community property may be transformed into separate property by
donation, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2343 (2006), and separate property may be
transformed into community property, LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 2343.1 (2006).
27. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2329, 2331 (2006).
28. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2331 (2006).
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matrimonial agreement purporting to be in authentic form was
signed by one of the witnesses after the marriage ceremony and
outside the presence of the parties.29 The court held that the
matrimonial agreement was not an authentic act, nor was it an act
under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses,
because neither spouse acknowledged it prior to the marriage
ceremony. 30  An attempted acknowledgment by the wife in the
partition proceedings after the divorce was not sufficient; all of the
requirements for either an authentic act or an act under private
signature duly acknowledged by the spouses must be met prior to,
or antecedent to, the marriage, absent compliance with the
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 requirements. 31 This article
generally requires that in order for the matrimonial agreement
executed during marriage to be valid, there must be a joint petition
to the court by the parties to the agreement and dual findings by
the court: (1) that the matrimonial agreement serves the best
interests of the parties, and (2) that they understand the governing
rules and principles.32 This process at times is described as
"judicial approval" of the matrimonial agreement.3 3 However, the
court is not called upon to approve or disapprove of the
matrimonial agreement; it must make judicial findings that the
agreement is in the best interests of both spouses and that the
spouses understand the rules and principles that govern
matrimonial regimes.34 If the spouses understand what the rules
would have been in the absence of the matrimonial agreement that
changes those rules and what the rules will be as a result of the
29. 666 So. 2d 1181, 1181 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d
395 (La. 1996).
30. Id. at 1184-85.
31. Id. at 1185.
32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Pelafigue v. Sudduth, 820 So. 2d 583, 588 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2002); Biondo v. Biondo, 769 So. 2d 94, 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000); Boyer v.
Boyer, 691 So. 2d 1234, 1244 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 701 So. 2d 984
(La. 1997); Langley v. Langley, 647 So. 2d 640, 642 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
Unfortunately, the words "without court approval" appear twice in article 2329,
each time specifying the instances in which article 2329 compliance is not
required. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006).
34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006).
2006]
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matrimonial agreement, it- is more likely that consent to the
changes will be knowingly and intelligently given.
The requirement for a judicial finding that the matrimonial
agreement is in the best interests of the spouses presents a closer
question. The court, rather than the parties, is called upon to
decide what is in the best interests of the contracting spouses. This
requirement also presents other problems. The terms and
conditions of most matrimonial agreements are designed to be in
the economic best interest of one party and against the economic
best interest of the other. The most frequent example is a
matrimonial agreement terminating the legal regime and
establishing a separation of property regime during marriage when
only one spouse is a substantial income earner or has substantial
separate property generating income that may not be classified as
civil fruits of that separate property. However, the article requires
that the- court make a judicial finding that the matrimonial
agreement serves the best interests of both spouses. Prior to the
judicial findings required by the article, typically no evidence is
adduced as to the relative financial situations of the spouses or the
economic effect on the spouses of the agreement.
The purpose of these article 2329 requirements is to prevent
imposition upon one spouse by the other spouse. Without a
meaningful judicial inquiry into the terms of the matrimonial
agreement and their effect on the spouses, this purpose is not
achieved. A more realistic requirement would be that there be
judicial findings: (1) that both parties understand the governing
rules and principles and the changes in those rules and principles
effected by the matrimonial agreement, and (2) that they have
knowingly agreed or consented to these changes. Whether
agreeing to these changes is in the best interest of a particular
spouse or the best interests of both spouses should be left up to
them to decide, not the court.
This proposal would place upon the court the responsibility or
duty to ascertain that the parties truly understand the consequences
of what they are doing and that they have both knowingly and
freely consented to it, rather than requiring the court to determine
if the agreement serves their mutual best interests. If judicial
supervision or oversight for the renunciation or modification of
marital property rights during marriage is to be required, it is
[Vol. 67
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important that the court prevent imposition on a spouse by the
other spouse by ascertaining and making a judicial finding as to
these matters. A function of the court should be to assure that the
spouses clearly understand the economic consequences of their
agreement. Each spouse should decide whether these economic
consequences are in his and her best interest. Also, the court
should determine whether consent to the agreement has been
knowingly and freely given.
Some have contended that this judicial supervision is not
needed to prevent imposition on a spouse by the other spouse
during marriage.3 5 Indeed, such imposition is already possible: a
spouse during marriage may waive final spousal support without
judicial supervision, and this waiver may have as much of a
devastating economic impact on a spouse as a waiver of the legal
regime. 36 Arguably, the legislature should give more protection to
spouses with reference to property and support rights that accrue
during marriage than those that might arise after the termination of
the marriage.3 If so, the protection afforded during the marriage
should be meaningful.
There are exceptions to these requirements. Spouses may
subject themselves to the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement
at any time "without court approval. 38 Also, during the first year
after moving into and acquiring a domicile in this state, spouses
35. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 19, at § 8.6, at 523-28.
36. See McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85, 91 (La. 1996), which
conversely opines that a waiver of the legal regime by a spouse potentially
involves greater consequences on the part of the non-earning spouse than would
a waiver of permanent alimony.
37. This view is reflected in the jurisprudential prohibition of the waiver of
the statutorily imposed duty of the spouses to support each other during
marriage, Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978), but permitting the
waiver of post-divorce spousal support, McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85. One court has
held that the purpose of the judicial supervision required by article 2329 is to
protect spouses who possess inferior bargaining positions. Poirier v. Poirier,
626 So. 2d 868, 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 389 (La.
1994). This policy is reflected, in part, in the provisions of Louisiana Civil
Code article 116, permitting the modification, waiver, or extinguishment of the
obligation of final spousal support, but not of an interim allowance. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 116 (2006).
38. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006). The use of the term "without
court approval" twice in this Civil Code article is unfortunate, as the court
neither approves nor disapproves of the agreement of the spouses. See id.
2006]
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may enter into a matrimonial agreement "without court
approval. 39 If a judgment of separation of property is rendered for
one of the stipulated causes, a reconciliation of the parties
reestablishes the legal regime, unless prior to the reconciliation, the
spouses execute a matrimonial agreement to the contrary, which
"need not be approved by the court. 'AO
In Poirier v. Poirier, while married, the Poiriers signed a
document entitled "Community Property Partition. '41 It purported
to partition community property, but the document contained the
following provisions:
[T]hey [Poiriers] desire to settle and liquidate the
community property which formerly existed between them.
. . . [S]he [Lynette] agrees to accept her interest in the
community property described herein to avoid any further
litigation between all parties; ... and.., the parties hereto
discharge each other from any further accounting of the
community property which formerly existed between them.
42
The court concluded that by referring to community property in
the past tense the parties intended to terminate the legal regime, not
just to partition community property of an existing legal regime.43
The court found that there were no dual judicial findings made
pursuant to article 2329; the recitation in the judgment of divorce
that the partition "be confirmed and made final" was not a
compliance with the article 2329 requirements; accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's annulling of the agreement.
39. Id.
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2375 (2006).
41. 626 So. 2d 868, 868-69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So.
2d 389 (La. 1994).
42. Id. at 869-70.
43. Id. at 870.
44. Id. In interpreting the requirements of article 2329 to be strictijuris, the
court found the purpose of the article to be the protection of spouses with
inferior bargaining positions: "Obviously, the Legislature found many spouses
possessed such inferior bargaining positions, that the law could not allow them
to give up their community rights without judicial supervision. Id. In face of




The agreement was, in part, a matrimonial agreement because
it purported, according to the court, to terminate the legal regime.
A partition of community property is not a matrimonial agreement
because it does not modify or terminate a matrimonial regime nor
modify any of its rules. Hence, dual judicial findings pursuant to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 are not required if the parties are
married at the time of the confection of the interspousal contract to
partition community property. The parties may voluntarily
partition the community property in whole or in part without
complying with the requirements of article 2329.45 If, however,
the agreement also reflects an intention to terminate the
matrimonial regime existing between the parties, as found by the
court in Poirier, then the dual judicial findings requirement of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 applies to that portion of the
agreement. Thus, if the dual judicial findings are not made, that
portion of the agreement attempting to terminate the regime is null.
If this portion of the agreement is severable, the portion of the
agreement partitioning the community property is valid.46
However, the court did not address the severability issue in
Poirier.
Johnson v. Johnson erroneously held "that a Marriage Contract
drawn up by the plaintiff before the marriage" that established "a
separate property agreement in lieu of a community property
regime," and which the court of appeal decided was "at the very
least ... executed by an act under private signature" was "valid as
to form. ' ' 7  Although wrong in its conclusion, the opinion
correctly quotes article 2331, which requires that a matrimonial
agreement be by authentic act or by act under private signature
duly acknowledged by the spouses.48
In Holland v. Holland, the husband contended that he and his
wife had an (apparently verbal) agreement "during their marriage
whereby he would support her while she was in medical school
and then she would support plaintiff while he pursued his
45. However, neither the community nor things of the community may be
judicially partitioned prior to the termination of the legal regime. LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2336 (2006).
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2034 (2006).
47. 614 So. 2d 884, 885 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
48. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2331 (2006).
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education." 49 In a classic goose/gander twist, the wife left the
husband shortly before her graduation from medical school. 50 He
sought "reimbursement" both under then Louisiana Civil Code
article 161 (now article 12 1) and under the "contract."51 The court
correctly found article 161 inapplicable because the petition for a
separation from bed and board was filed prior to the effective date
of this article. 52 The court also found "that the plaintiff has no
cause of action for reimbursement in contract."5 3 It correctly held
that article 2330, which prohibits certain types of contracts
between spouses because of a strong public policy against these
types of contracts between spouses, was inapplicable in this case.54
Then, it correctly cited the form requirements of article 2331 for
matrimonial agreements (i.e., an authentic act or act under private
signature duly acknowledged by the spouses), but held that "[t]he
plaintiff has failed to indicate the existence of such a formalized
agreement, which would give rise to a valid cause of action,"
finally affirming the trial court's decision to sustain an exception
of no cause of action.55
This, of course, is wrong. The claimed agreement was not a
matrimonial agreement: it did not affect any rule or principle of the
property regime of the parties, and the form requirements of article
2331 were not applicable to the contract. If they had been, the
agreement also would have required compliance with the judicial
findings requirement of article 2329 because it was entered into
during the marriage. Nor was the object of the agreement any
property of the parties, either separate or community. The claim
for financial contributions made during the marriage to the
education or training of a spouse under Louisiana Civil Code
articles 121 through 124 is not a reimbursement claim, a property
claim, or a spousal support claim. Comment (f) to article 121
states, "The second paragraph of this Article is intended to make
clear that the contemplated award is not spousal support or a





54. Id. at 1012-13.
55. Id. at 1013.
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disposition of community property., 56 The basic error of the court
was in apparently assuming that any agreement between married
persons is a matrimonial agreement, which, unfortunately, is an
often repeated mistake.
In Washington v. Washington, a husband and wife entered into
a written contract (an act under private signature) for the avowed
purpose of settling "their respective property rights and to agree on
support provisions for the Wife and Children," including a specific
provision for support of the wife's two children, who were not the
husband's children. 57 The contract provided that the agreement
"may be offered in evidence" and, "if acceptable to the court, shall
be incorporated by reference in any judgment that may be
rendered. ' 8  When, in a divorce proceeding, 'the wife sought to
enforce the portion of the agreement concerning the support of her
children, the court wrongly held the agreement to be a matrimonial
agreement.59 It referred to Louisiana Civil Code article 2328,
which defines a matrimonial agreement as "a contract establishing
a regime of separation of property or modifying or terminating a
legal regime"; article 2329, containing the dual judicial findings
requirements for matrimonial agreements entered into during
marriage; and article 2331, containing the form requirements for
matrimonial agreements. 60 It then concluded:
The contract in question was neither by authentic act nor
was it an act under private signature duly acknowledged by
the parties. Therefore, pretermitting the question of
validity of the husband's agreement to support children of
whom he is not the legal or natural father, we find the
marital contract void for failure of the parties to comply
with the form requirements of Article 2331. Therefore, the
trial court correctly rejected the wife's reconventional
demands. 6
1
56. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 121 cmt. (f) (2006).
57. 471 So. 2d 925, 925-26 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 926.
59. Id. at 926-27.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 927.
2006]
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The agreement was not a matrimonial agreement. The
referenced articles 2328, 2329, and 2331 are not applicable to the
agreement. It was an interspousal contract, which has neither a
judicial findings requirement nor any form requirement not
applicable to contracts in general. Once again, the error seems to
be the assumption that all agreements between spouses are
matrimonial agreements.
The dual judicial findings requirement of a matrimonial
agreement (if executed during the marriage) and the form
requirements (whenever executed) are essential to the validity of
that type of interspousal contract. Under article 2332, lack of
proper registry of the matrimonial agreement does not invalidate
the matrimonial agreement as between the parties; however, lack
of registry may render the agreement ineffective as to third
persons:
A matrimonial agreement . . . is effective toward third
persons as to immovable property when it is filed for
registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which
the immovable property is situated, and as to movables
when filed for registry in the parish or parishes in which the
spouses are domiciled.62
These registry requirements regulate only the effect of the
matrimonial agreement as to third persons; although unrecorded, if
the form and other requirements are met, the matrimonial
agreement is valid as between the parties.
In contrast to a matrimonial agreement, other interspousal
contracts do not have any special form requirements or other
requirements because the parties are married to each other at the
time of the agreement. They are subject only to the general rules
governing the proof of obligations and the special rules governing
the proof of some particular types of obligations. 63 The latter
include the form requirements for an inter vivos trust;6 for a sale
of immovable property; 65 for a conventional mortgage; 66 for a
62. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2332 (2006).
63. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1831-53 (2006).
64. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1752-55 (2006).
65. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1839, 2440 (2006).
66. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3287 (2006).
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contract of mandate;67 for donations inter vivos of immovables and
corporeal and incorporeal movables (which itself involves varying
form requirements); 68 and for other types of juridical acts. All of
these types of transactions (and others, including inter vivos
donations of life insurance) 69 may be the object of interspousal
70contracts.
There are no special registry requirements for interspousal
contracts that are not matrimonial agreements. Depending upon
the nature of the interspousal contract and its subject matter
(object), there may be registry requirements in order for the
interspousal contract to be effective as to third persons. These
include the filing for registry requirements for the alienation 71 and
encumbrance 72 of immovables, donations of immovables, 73 and
contracts of partnership.74
Under prior law, spouses were prohibited from entering into
contracts with each other except in certain limited situations.
75
The present matrimonial regimes law reverses this rule, providing
that spouses can contract with each other to the same extent as
persons who are not married to each other, except in certain limited
situations.76  This freedom of interspousal contracting includes
67. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2993 (2006).
68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1536-50 (2006).
69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1521 (2006).
70. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 517, 1554 (2006).
72. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3308 (2006).
73. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1554 (2006).
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2806 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3401-
10, 3421-22, 3431-35 (2006).
75. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2446 (1870), repealed by 1979 La.
Acts No. 709, § 2; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1790 (1870), amended by 1979
La. Acts No. 711, § 1, repealed by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1. See also
Miller v. Miller, 102 So. 2d 52, 56-57 (La. 1957) (holding article 1790
prohibited a husband and wife from contracting with each other, except in
limited circumstances).
76. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2329-30 (2006).
It should be noted that, unlike article 2329, article 2330 is not limited to
matrimonial agreements. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2330 (2006). Its public
policy proscriptions apply to any "agreement" of the spouses. Id. The first type
of agreement, one to alter the marital portion, is a matrimonial agreement, as the
marital portion is an incident of any matrimonial regime. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
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sales, donations, voluntary partitions of any or all of the
community or co-owned separate assets, compromises of disputes,
employment contracts in which one spouse is employer and the
other employee, partnership agreements, the formation of
corporations and other legal entities or juridical persons, and any
other type of contract into which any other two consenting adults
having contractual capacity are permitted to enter, subject to
general public policy limitations and with the exception of certain
specified types of agreements between spouses that are prohibited
for public policy reasons.77
Louisiana Civil Code article 2330 limits the contractual
freedom of the spouses as to certain specified matters of public
order or public policy. 78 Spouses may not, either before or during
marriage, renounce or alter the marital portion or the established
order of succession, nor may they limit with respect to third
persons the right that one spouse alone has under the legal regime
art. 2433 (2006). An agreement to alter the established order of succession is
not a matrimonial agreement, as these rules for intestate successions, contained
in articles 880-901, are not rules of any matrimonial regime. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. arts. 880-901 (2006). However, an agreement of the spouses to limit with
respect to third persons the right that one spouse alone has under the legal
regime to obligate the community or to alienate, encumber, or lease community
property is a matrimonial agreement. It changes one of the management rules of
the legal regime, that each spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose
of community property unless otherwise provided by law. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2346 (2006).
The juxtaposition of articles 2329 and 2330 and their comments presents a
problem and may cause confusion. The text of article 2329 provides that
spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage as to
all matters that are not prohibited by public policy. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2329 (2006). However, none of the examples given in comment (a) to article
2329 require a matrimonial agreement. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 cmt.
(a) (2006). These kinds of agreements would be affected by an interspousal
contract which is not a matrimonial agreement. In article 2330, the text is not
restricted to matrimonial agreements, but includes any agreement between the
spouses. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2330 (2006). It proscribes two actions
that would require a matrimonial agreement and one that would not However,
the comment speaks only of matrimonial agreements. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2330 cmts. (a)-(d) (2006).
77. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2329-30 (2006).
78. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2330 (2006).
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to obligate the community or to alienate, encumber, or lease
community property. 79 These specific public policy restrictions
apply both to matrimonial agreements and other interspousal
contracts. 80 Additionally, any rule of public order or public policy
applies to both types of contracts. 81 Any act in derogation of laws
enacted for the protection of the public interest is an absolute
nullity, whether it is a matrimonial agreement or another type of
interspousal contract.82
II. RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Not surprisingly, several cases deal with retirement benefit
issues. In two cases, the participant spouse claimed a Hare v.
Hodgins modification to the Sims formula in the allocation of the
retirement benefits.8 3  In Donaldson v. Donaldson, the husband
79. Id.
80. See sources cited supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 7 (2006).
83. Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 128 (La. 1991), held that if an
increase in pension benefits is due to personal effort or achievement after the
termination of the community that has little or no relationship with the prior
community, the community should not be given credit for it in the
apportionment of the pension benefits. Such increase in benefits might occur
where the employee spouse attains a significantly higher-paying position while
remaining within the coverage of the same pension plan, either through earning
a post-community degree, or transfer within the company to an unrelated area of
service. Id. On the other hand, when such an increase results from nonpersonal
elements such as longevity raises, cost-of-living raises, forfeitures by terminated
employees, and investment returns, the community should participate in that
gain. Id. The employee spouse claiming an adjustment has the burden of proof.
Id.
Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 923 (La. 1978), held that to the extent that an
employee's contractual pension right derives from the spouse's employment
during the existence of the community, it is a community asset subject to
division upon dissolution of the community. The employee's spouse is entitled
to be recognized as the owner of one-half of the value attributable to the pension
or deferred compensation right earned during the existence of the community.
Id. When the fixed percentage method is used to calculate the non-employee
spouse's portion of the pension benefits in a defined benefits plan, the
community portion of the pension right is deemed to be the same fraction that
results when the length of the employee spouse's creditable employment during
2006]
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was a bus driver-motorman employed by the New Orleans Public
Service Authority, and after the divorce, he was promoted to
dispatcher, with a slight increase in pay.8 4 The court held this
increase did not justify a Hare v. Hodgins adjustment in the
allocation of the benefits payable by his defined benefits pension
plan.85 Additionally, seventeen years after his divorce, as a result
of collective bargaining negotiations, a "Thirty-and-Out" program
was instituted, in which all employees were allowed to retire after
thirty years' credit in the retirement plan, regardless of age; further,
all employees were required to make contributions to fund the
program.86 Donaldson made the contributions out of his current
earnings for two years prior to his retirement, and, in return, he
received full retirement benefits upon his retirement at age sixty-
two, instead of early retirement benefits, for an effective increase
of nine percent.
8 7
The court of appeal, relying, in part, on Hare v. Hodgins, held
that Donaldson's gross retirement benefit should be reduced by
nine percent before calculating his wife's community interest in
the benefit.88  Although the facts do not fit within the Hare's
requirement that the increase in the pension benefits be "due purely
to his personal effort and skill and unrelated to his prior
community earnings,"8 9 the result in Donaldson seems fair and
consistent with matrimonial regimes principles. The increase in
retirement benefits resulting from the post-termination "Thirty-
and-Out" program did not result from a foundation provided by
prior community earnings, as in Hare.90 However, in Hare, the
supreme court did not indicate that post-termination individual
effort was the only reason to modify the Sims straight-line
apportionment, noting that the emerging jurisprudential concepts
the community is divided by the length of his total creditable service, which is a
straight-line apportionment of benefits. Id. at 924.
84. 831 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 420-21.
86. Id. at418-19.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 420-21.




were not yet well defined.9' Other post-termination significant
events unassociated with employment during the legal regime that
result in a substantial increase in retirement benefits and which are
not fairly ascribable to employment during the community should
be considered by the courts in determining an equitable
apportionment of the retirement benefits.
The former husband unsuccessfully sought a Hare adjustment
in Goetzman v. Goetzman based upon the fact that his labor union,
which controls and operates his pension plan, increased through
collective bargaining its members' retirement benefits three times
between the termination of the community and the trial of the
partition action.92 However, the evidence showed that this was a
continuation of the pattern that existed during the legal regime, that
the increases in benefits were not unusual or extraordinary, but
rather were regular and expected. 93 The benefits were increased
once a year, if actuarially reasonable, and had been increased at
least nine times during the legal regime of the parties.94 The Hare
adjustment was properly denied. 95
Smith v. Smith involved a dispute between the first and second
wives of a deceased Bossier City fireman (who was employed
during both marriages) over the survivor benefits paid to the
second wife, the designated beneficiary, as a result of his death.96
The court held that the first wife was entitled to her Sims portion of
the survivor benefits under Johnson v. Wetherspoon.97  The
Bossier Firemen's Pension and Relief Fund is a non-qualified plan
not subject to the federal Employee Retirement Income Act of
1974 ("ERISA") because the Bossier City plan is a governmental
plan, and governmental plans are not subject to ERISA.9'
However, if the survivor benefits had been a part of a private
91. Id. at 128.
92. 835 So. 2d 731, 733-34 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 735.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 839 So. 2d 1255, 1256-57 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003).
97. Id. at 1257 (citing Johnson v. Wetherspoon, 694 So. 2d 203, 206-07
(La. 1997)). See also Vicknair v. Firefighters' Pension & Relief Fund of New
Orleans, 907 So. 2d 787, 789-90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2004).
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pension plan subject to ERISA (a "qualified plan"), the result
would have been different. The United States Supreme Court in
Boggs v. Boggs held that ERISA preempted Louisiana law insofar
as it applied to the qualified joint and survivor annuity mandated
by ERISA, reasoning that Congress intended that the named
beneficiary receive the survivor annuity, and to the extent that state
law recognized any other claims to it, state law must yield to
federal law under principles of preemption.99
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801(A)(4)(a) provides
that, in a community property partition action, the court shall value
the assets as of the time of trial on the merits of the partition
action.100 At issue in Sparcella v. Hero was the correct basis for
the valuation of the accumulated sick leave of the husband.' 0 ' A
community property partition agreement provided that the wife
was entitled to one-half of the accumulated and unused sick leave
of the husband during the existence of the community, payable
upon his retirement or end of employment with the City of New
Orleans Fire Department.10 2 The value of his sick leave was based
upon his daily rate of pay; at the termination of the community, his
daily rate of pay was $118.57, and at retirement it was $154.28. 103
The wife contended that the community interest in the sick leave
should be calculated based upon his daily rate of pay at retirement,
when the sick leave was payable. 1°4 Rejecting this contention and
using the daily rate of pay at the termination of the community to
calculate the community interest in the value of the accumulated
sick leave, the court relied primarily on the intent of the parties as
reflected in the partition agreement. 05 The court held that since
the parties had partitioned this asset in that agreement, the wife
was not entitled to participate in any increase in value of the asset
between the termination of the community and retirement of the
husband, when the asset was distributed. 10 6 Absent the partition
99. 520 U.S. 833, 836 (1997).
100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(A)(4)(a) (2006).
101. 848 So. 2d 610, 611-12 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 612.
104. Id. at 612-13.




agreement, it is not so clear that the sick leave benefits should be
valued as of the date of the termination of the community in view
of the supreme court's insistence that the non-participant spouse is
entitled to participate in the continued appreciation in value of the
community assets after the termination of the community until
their partition.10 7 The procedural requirement that the assets be
valued as of the time of trial on the merits of the partition action
reflects this view.1
0 8
Another issue involving the timing of the valuation was
presented in Rivera-Santos v. Rivera-Santos.10 9 At the time of his
divorce, the husband was a Staff Sergeant, E-6, in the United
States Army; thereafter, he applied for Warrant Officer school, was
accepted, attended that and other special training schools, and was
eventually appointed a Warrant Officer, W-2.1' ° The evidence
reflected that the move from a Noncommissioned Officer ("NCO")
to a Warrant Officer is not a normal progression of benefits or
promotions; indeed, it was described by a military expert witness
"as an extraordinary move.""'  The court applied the Hare
107. In Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 120-21 (La. 1991), the supreme
court reiterated this view:
The appeals court erred in basing its distribution to the non-employee
spouse upon a valuation of the pension right as of the termination of the
community in 1975. Procedurally, a court partitioning community
property is required to value the assets as of the time of trial on the
merits. La. R.S. 9:2801(4)(a). Moreover, and perhaps more important,
the appellate decision is in conflict with substantive law in several
respects. The termination of the community does not have the effect of
freezing the value of each spouse's undivided interest in the community
assets. Each spouse continues to be a co-owner of the assets until they
are partitioned and, as such, is entitled to benefit from any appreciation
in their value. In the present case, because the pension right ascribable
to the community was not partitioned prior to its maturity in 1988, each
spouse is entitled to a distribution based on the actual value of the fully
matured pension. Consequently, it is incorrect to base the 1988
partition on the much lower valuation as of 1975 when the pension
right was subject to contingencies that might have prevented its
maturity.
108. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(A)(4)(a) (2006).
109. 862 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2003).
110. Id. at 484.
111. Id. at 483.
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modification of the Sims formula and calculated the wife's interest
in his military retired pay based upon his rank and pay at the time
of the divorce as opposed to his rank and pay at the time of his
retirement. 1
2
Whether or not a spouse has waived an interest in the other
spouse's retirement benefits in a community partition agreement
continues to be an issue. After canvassing the intermediate
appellate court decisions, the supreme court in Robinson v.
Robinson announced the rule to be: "When the agreement does not
expressly address the employee spouse's pension, the issue of
whether the agreement divests the non-employee spouse of any
community property rights in the pension depends upon the intent
of the parties."'l3
The pertinent inquiries are: (1) whether the pension plan is
listed in the agreement, and, if not, (2) whether it was discussed by
the parties as a part of the settlement. 1 4 If the answer to both of
these inquiries is in the negative, the pension plan was not
partitioned in the agreement.' 5 The issue of whether a pension
was considered in property settlement discussions is a question of
fact. 1 16 The customary "boiler-plate" language in the agreement
does not necessarily divest the non-employee spouse of his or her
right in the employee spouse's pension.
Although Robinson and the supreme court's subsequent
opinion in Jennings v. Turner did much to clarify the effect of
clauses in a community property settlement agreement, which are
variously referred to as omnibus clauses, general divestiture
clauses, and boiler-plate clauses, the opinions did not conclude that
all such clauses fail to transfer one spouse's interest in a pension
plan to the other spouse."18  Both opinions state that such
divestiture language does not "necessarily" have this effect," 9
112. Id. at 483-84.
113. 778 So. 2d 1105, 1121 (La. 2001).
114. Id. at 1120-21.
115. Id. at 1121.
116. Id. at 1119.
117. Id. at 1121.
118. See Jennings v. Turner, 803 So. 2d 963 (La. 2001); Robinson, 778 So.
2d 1105.
119. Jennings, 803 So. 2d at 965; Robinson, 778 So. 2d at 1121.
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leaving open the possibility that such a clause in a particular case
might be specific enough to have this legal effect. Although one
may expect divergent results in the retrospective search for the
intent of the parties in a transaction, the application of these rules
should produce more consistent results than those reflected in the
previous appellate court decisions.
Presumably, these rules also apply to other objects of a
community property partition agreement, including other assets,
obligations, and reimbursement claims. The cases should be a
reminder to the practitioner not to rely on general divestiture
clauses, but to take care that all these matters are expressly
provided for in the agreement and also to take care to document,
where appropriate, any discussions between the parties and their
attorneys concerning any matter which is not subsequently
expressly incorporated into the agreement.
III. DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PLAN ("DROP")
In Smith v. Smith, 120 a case involving a Deferred Retirement
Option Plan ("DROP") in a public retirement plan, the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal reaffirmed its rejection of the
reasoning of the fifth circuit in Schlosser v. Behan,121 joining the
first, third, and fourth circuits in their refusal to follow
Schlosser.122  The manner in which DROP operates in a public
retirement plan was explained by the writer in previous articles:
[A] member who is eligible for regular retirement may
make a one time election to participate in the Deferred
Retirement Option Plan (DROP) for a specified period not
exceeding three years. If the member does so, the member
120. 839 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003).
121. 722 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998), writ denied, 739 So. 2d 791
(La. 1999).
122. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 892 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004), writ
denied, 901 So. 2d 1104 (La. 2005); Knighten v. Knighten, 809 So. 2d 324,
333-34 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001), writ denied, 805 So. 2d 207 (La. 2002),
vacated on other grounds, Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003); Sullivan
v. Sullivan, 801 So. 2d 1093 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 800 So. 2d 876 (La.
2001); Zalfen v. Albright, 791 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied sub
nom, Albright v. Albright, 803 So. 2d 31 (La. 2001).
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is considered to be in a retired status although he continues
to work and is paid for his work. However, for retirement
benefit purposes, his final average compensation and
creditable service remain fixed, or "frozen," as of the date
of commencement of participation in DROP. The
member's retirement benefits, based on his final average
compensation and creditable service, which otherwise
would... be payable to him, are not paid to him but are
credited to a DROP account during his participation in
DROP. The funds in the DROP account are invested and
the member is credited with his proportionate share of the
account's earnings and growth, or losses. At the member's
termination of both his employment and his participation in
DROP, the amount credited to him in the DROP account is
paid to him either in a lump sum or in installments.
Additionally, he then commences to receive his regular
monthly retirement benefits, which previously had been
deposited in the DROP account.
123
The deposits being credited to him in the DROP account
are not a result of his efforts and earnings during his
participation in DROP; they are the result of his
employment and earnings prior to his retirement and prior
to his participation in DROP. 1
24
Whether the employee enters DROP upon his retirement during
the legal regime or thereafter is immaterial. 125 His participation in
DROP does not affect the amount of his retirement benefits. He
does not "earn" or receive additional retirement benefits by
participating in DROP. The assumption that he does was the basic
123. Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 59 LA. L.
REV. 465, 473-74 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
124. Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes, supra note 21, at 410-11 (footnotes
omitted). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:447 et seq. (Deferred Retirement
Option Plan ("DROP") provisions of the State Employees Retirement System);
id. § 11:786 et seq. (DROP provisions of. the Teachers' Retirement System of
Louisiana ("TRSLA")). /
125. Sullivan, 801 So. 2d at 1096; Bullock v. Owens, 796 So. 2d 170, 174-75
(La. App. 2d Cir. 2001).
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error in Schlosser,126 as well as in the wife's contention in
McKinstry v. McKinstry that if she elected to enter the Teachers'
Deferred Retirement Option Plan ("DROP"), her husband should
not receive credit for the "increased retirement benefits" that she
claimed she would receive from her participation in DROP.1
27
IV. VALUATION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801(A)(4)(a), regulating
the procedure in an action to partition community property,
provides that the court shall value the assets as of the time of trial
on the merits. 28  The act does not provide a formula for
determining the value of the community assets. 129  It has been
suggested that an inflexible formula for determining the value of a
business would be impractical:
Business valuations methods are not an exact science and
are basically guides to determine a fair market value for
buyers and sellers of a given business. Here, the evaluation
is made for the purpose of resolving community property
disputes. Given the dynamics of businesses and business
practices, factoring in circumstances that may be unique to
126. Schlosser v. Behan, 722 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998), writ
denied, 739 So. 2d 791 (La. 1999).
127. 824 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002), writ denied, 834 So. 2d
438 (La. 2003).
128. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(A)(4)(a) (2006). See also McDonald v.
McDonald, 909 So. 2d 694, 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005) (citing Ellington v.
Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1269 (La.
2003); Razzaghe-Ashrifi v. Razzaghe-Ashrifi, 558 So. 2d 1368 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1990)). The second circuit interpreted this provision as granting broad
discretion in valuing businesses in partition actions:
The purpose of [La. R.S. 9:2801(4)(a)] is to provide an occasion for the
court to get a handle on the situation. It does not mean that the court is
frozen by any statutory time level or particular valuation at any
particular time or for any particular purpose, but simply to place values
on the assets for the purpose of accounting, allocation and adjudication,
in accordance with the further provisions of La. R.S. 98:2801(4)(b, c, d
and e).
Id.
129. See McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 696; Starr v. Starr, 557 So. 2d 1026, 1028
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
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the parties, an inflexible formula for determining value is
said to be impractical.
30
The courts have had occasion to decide only a limited number
of business valuation issues in community property partition
actions. Although Section 9:2801(A)(4)(a) mandates valuation as
of the time of the trial on the merits of the partition action, if the
parties do not present valuation evidence as of that date, a court
does not err in making its valuations based upon the evidence
submitted.' 3 ' The court is not required to value assets as of the
date of trial when the parties do not submit current appraisals or
evaluations. In view of the broad discretion granted a trial court
in the partition of community property, the court is not required to
accept at face value a party's valuation of assets. 133  The trial
court's choice of one expert's method of valuation over that of
another will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous.'
34
Where expert testimony differs, it is the trier of fact who must
determine the more credible evidence. 135 The fact-finder is entitled
to assess the credibility and accept the opinion of an expert just as
with any other witness, unless the stated reasons of the expert are
patently unsound. 136 The effect and weight to be given to expert
testimony depends upon the underlying facts.' 37 In deciding to
accept the opinion of one expert and reject that of another, a trial
130. Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998). See also
McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 699; Gill v. Gill, 895 So. 2d 807, 813 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2005); Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 1166-67 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 847 So. 2d 1269 (La. 2003); Schiro v. Schiro, 839 So. 2d 304, 308 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2003); Collier v. Collier, 790 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 803 So. 2d 30 (La. 2001); Achee v. Nat'l Tea Co., 686 So. 2d 121,
125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593, 595-96 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1994).
131. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1165.
132. Id. at 1165.
133. Id. at 1166.
134. McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 699; Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1166.
135. Chance v. Chance, 694 So. 2d 613, 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Mason v. Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 2006).
136. Id
137. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1167; Chance, 694 So. 2d at 617.
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court will virtually never be manifestly erroneous.'38 The trial
court's determination of the value of a business is a factual one
which will not be disturbed absent manifest error.'3 9 Thus, if the
trial court's valuations are reasonably supported by the record and
do not constitute an abuse of discretion, its valuation determination
should be affirmed.
If a business has accounts receivables, their value may be
discounted for collectibility and the cost of collecting the




Goodwill of a professional person is not a factor in the
valuation of the professional's practice because his goodwill
results from his professional competence and his relationship with
his patients or clients, and not from any affiliation between the
legal entity, of which he is an owner, and the patients or clients. 42
Goodwill of a community-owned corporation, commercial, or
professional business may be included in its valuation.
43
138. Chance, 694 So. 2d at 617.
139. McDonald, 909 So. 2d at 699; Chance, 694 So. 2d at 617.
140. Chance, 694 So. 2d at 618.
141. Id.; Barrow v. Barrow, 669 So. 2d 622, 627 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 675 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1996), vacated on other grounds, Talbot v. Talbot,
864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003). See also Rigby, supra note 123, at 486.
142. Chance, 694 So. 2d at 617. See also Rigby, supra note 123, at 486.
143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2, enacted by 2003 La. Acts No. 837, §
1. This section provided:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may include, in
the valuation of a community commercial business, the goodwill of the
business. Goodwill shall not be included in the valuation of a business
when goodwill results solely from the identity, reputation, or
qualifications of the owner or from his relationship with customers of
the business.
Id.
In 2004 the legislature broadened the scope of the exclusion of goodwill in the
valuation of a commercial business through an amendment to this statute. As
amended, Section 9:2801.2 provides:
In a proceeding to partition the community, the court may include, in
the valuation of any community-owned corporate, commercial, or
professional business, the goodwill of the business. However, that
portion of the goodwill attributable to any personal quality of the
spouse awarded the business shall not be included in the valuation of
the business.
2006]
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2006) (amended 2004).
Previously, the value of goodwill was excluded from the valuation when it
resulted "solely" from the named attributes of the owner or from his relationship
with customers of the business. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2003),
amended by 2004 La. Acts No. 177, § 1. Under the 2004 amendment, the
exclusion of goodwill in evaluation extends to that portion of the goodwill
attributable to "any" personal quality of the spouse awarded the business. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2006) (amended 2004). This appears to expand
the source of goodwill that may not be considered in valuing the business. See
id. However, another source that could not be considered in valuation in the
previous act, the relationship of the owner to his customers, was eliminated in
the 2004 amendment. See id.
Also to be noted is that the statute, prior to its 2004 amendment, was
restricted in its application to a "commercial business." See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2003), amended by 2004 La. Acts No. 177, § 1. The 2004
amendment includes a "professional business." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2
(2006) (amended 2004). Louisiana jurisprudence has not permitted the
consideration of goodwill in a professional practice, whether it is conducted as a
sole proprietorship or in a partnership, limited liability company, or corporate
form. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 486. The amendment appears to broaden
the types of business in which goodwill may be included as a factor in the
valuation of the business to include a professional business. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2006) (amended 2004). But it has narrowed the sources of
goodwill that may be considered in a particular business in excluding the
goodwill of the business that is attributable to any personal quality of the owner.
See id.
Additionally, the 2004 amendment applies to any "community-owned"
corporate, commercial, or professional business. Id. The "community" does not
own anything. Id. The legal regime of community of acquets and gains is one
of several systems of principles and rules governing the ownership and
management of the property of married persons as between themselves and
towards third persons. LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. arts. 2325-27 (2006). The
community of acquets and gains is not a legal entity (juridical person). LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (c) (2006).
The disjunctive use of the words "corporate, commercial, or professional
business" presents interpretative problems. Obviously, the words "commercial,
or professional business" used disjunctively were intended to distinguish
between those types of businesses. Was the 2004 amendment intended to
restrict the application of the provisions of the section to corporate businesses,
excluding those businesses organized as a partnership or a limited liability
company or operated as a sole proprietorship? If the provisions were intended
to apply only to corporations, there should be no commas after the words
"corporate" and "commercial." However, the structure of the sentence as
written implies that the words "corporate," "commercial," and "professional,"
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However, that portion of the goodwill attributable to any personal
quality of the spouse awarded the business shall not be included in
the value of the business.1'
Goodwill has been defined, inter alia, as the value of a
business resulting from the probability that the customers of the
establishment will continue their patronage. 14 5 When a sale of a
business to a third party is not contemplated, as in the case of the
partition of community property, the value of the business should
be determined without a discount because of the ownership of a
minority interest in the business or because of lack of marketability
of the business.' 
46
If the community asset to be valued is an interest in a
partnership or corporation, the court must be careful to value the
interest, not just the assets of the business entity.147
Until recently, Louisiana courts, and the courts of nearly all
states, rejected the consideration of future tax consequences in the
valuation of property received in a community property partition,
including a real estate partnership and a medical corporation.
48
In Hansel v. Holyfield, Mr. Hansel was allocated non-qualified
stock options worth $25,673,272, which he had to exercise by
used disjunctively, all qualify the word "business." Particularly troublesome is
the disjunctive use of the words "corporate" and "commercial" and of
"corporate" and "professional." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2006)
(amended 2004).
See also Godwin v. Godwin, 533 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ
denied, 537 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1989); Kelly M. Haggar, Comment, A Catalyst in
the Cotton: The Proper Allocation of the "Goodwill" of Closely Held
Businesses and Professional Practices in Dissolution of Marriages, 65 LA. L.
REV. 1191, 1253-54 (2005) (discussing the evolution of Louisiana Revised
Statutes Section 9:2801.2); Rigby, supra note 123, at 486 (discussing goodwill
as a factor in the valuation of a business).
144. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.2 (2006) (amended 2004).
145. Godwin, 533 So. 2d at 1010.
146. Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 238 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998); Mexic v.
Mexic, 577 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
147. McDonald v. McDonald, 909 So. 2d 694, 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005);
Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 1166 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
847 So. 2d 1269 (La. 2003).
148. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 484. See infra notes 153-59 and
accompanying text for a detailed review of this jurisprudence.
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specified dates or lose the options. 149 The ,difference between the
"strike price" (the price at which the stock was to be purchased
from the employer under the stock option agreement) and the
market price of the stock at the time the option is exercised is taxed
at rates applicable to ordinary income, and the exercise of the
option triggers the tax liability.'50 The income taxes that would be
due upon the exercise of the options when they were exercised in
the future was estimated to be $10,963,365.14, but the trial court
denied credit in the valuation of the options for this future tax
liability.' 5' The appellate court reversed and allowed Mr. Hansel
credit in the valuation of the options for the taxes to be due upon
exercise of the options, resulting in a reduction of $5,481,682.57 in
the equalizing payment he owed his wife. 152 The court reasoned:
The trial court disallowed tax consequences not because it
found the exercise of the options or the imposition of the
taxes to be speculative, but, rather, because it found the
amount of taxes to be speculative. However, at trial, Mr.
Hansel submitted evidence that he is subject to the
maximum applicable tax rate (39.5% in federal taxes and
6% in state taxes). Although it is possible that Mr. Hansel
may be taxed at a lower rate, the rate of taxation is no more
speculative than the value of the stock options themselves.
Recognizing the speculative value of a stock option but
refusing to recognize the speculative rate of taxation on the
value of those options is simply inequitable.' 53
Mr. Hansel argued in the appellate court that his situation was
different from that of the spouses in the cases in which future tax
consequences in the valuation of assets were disallowed. 154 In
those cases, both the fact of whether there would ever be any taxes
due upon disposition of the property received in the partition, and
149. 779 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), writ denied, 789 So. 2d 591
(La. 2001).
150. Id. at 944.
151. Id. at 946-47.
152. Id.




the amount of the taxes, if any were payable, were speculative. 55
These speculative issues included whether or not there would ever
be a disposition of the property triggering an ordinary or capital
gain, the price to be received in the future sale of the property, the
basis of the taxpayer in the property when that event occurred, the
tax rates applicable to ordinary and capital gains when the event
occurred, and the particular tax rates applicable to the taxpayer at
that time.' 56 Unlike the other cases in which the tax liability was
triggered by a disposition of the property, if Mr. Hansel exercised
an option and thus acquired stock, a tax liability was created at that
time; only the tax rate of Mr. Hansel at that time was uncertain.'
57
The income tax consequences of the allocation of assets to a
spouse are not per se excluded as an element of the value of an
allocated asset. If income taxes related to the allocated asset have
already been paid by that spouse, 158 or if the allocation triggers an
immediate and specific tax consequence,' 59 a reduction in value of
the allocated asset equal to the taxes paid or owed has been
allowed. The tax consequences of the allocation of an asset should
be excluded in valuing that asset only when the probability and
amount of the tax consequences are too remote or speculative to be
useful in the valuation process.
In Gill v. Gill, at issue was the proper method, or approach, in
the valuation of a community limited liability company ("LLC") in
partition proceedings.' 60 The expert testifying for the wife used an
income-based aproach, while the husband's expert used an asset-
based appraisal. The husband was the funeral home director and
licensed embalmer of a funeral home owned by the spouses, which
led the court to find that the future income of the funeral home was
155. See cases cited infra note 158.
156. Seeid.
157. Hansel, 779 So. 2d at 944.
158. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 831 So. 2d 416, 420 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002);
Overton v. Overton, 694 So. 2d 491, 495 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 703
So. 2d 26 (La. 1997); Barrow v. Barrow, 669 So. 2d 622, 628 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 675 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1996), vacated on other grounds, Talbot v.
Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003). See also Rigby, supra note 123, at 484.
159. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 484.
160. 895 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 814.
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uniquely tied to the husband's personal skills.' 6 2 Therefore, the
court decided that a focus on the net assets of the LLC, including
an amount for the goodwill of the established going concern, was
the appropriate method of valuation. 1
63
A review of the cases involving the valuation of community
businesses for partition purposes reveals that the expert opinion
testimony generally has concentrated on only two competing
valuation methods, also known as approaches to valuation. These
are the net asset value method and the capitalization of earnings
method. These two competing valuation methods were at issue in
Ellington v. Ellington.164 In that case, the appellate court agreed
with the trial court's observation that the definition of fair market
value derived from the United States Treasury Regulations is
inappropriate and useless in a partition of a community business,
as that proceeding does not involve a "willing buyer and willing
seller" contemplated in the definition of fair market value
contained in the Treasury Regulations. 165 The court concluded that
neither statute nor jurisprudence prohibits a court from recognizing
that a community business can have different values depending
upon which spouse acquires it. 66
This focus on two valuation methods has sometimes deprived
the courts of the opportunity of considering other valuation
methods that may be appropriate or useful in the partitioning of a
particular community business.167 Methods for valuing a business
162. Id. at 813-14.
163. Id. at 814.
164. 842 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1269 (La.
2003). For a discussion of the issue of goodwill and its treatment in divorce
cases in general and the Ellington case in particular, see Haggar, supra note 143.
165. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1167-69. Treasury Regulations Section
25.2512-1 essentially provides that fair market value is that value, expressed in
cash or its equivalent, at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy
and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts. 26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-1 (2004).
166. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1169.
167. In McGehee v. McGehee, 543 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 548 So. 2d 327 (La. 1989), the value of the "book of business" of an
insurance agency was calculated by determining the amount of insurance
commissions and applying a multiplier of 1.5. In Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593,
[Vol. 67
MA4 TRIMONIAL REGIMES
that are available and may be appropriate in a partition of a
particular business, in addition to an asset-based approach and
capitalization of earnings approach, are the discounted cash flow
approach, market approach, capitalization of excess earnings
approach, investment value approach, intrinsic value approach,
freely traded value, and others. 1°
An asset-based approach to the valuation of a going business
considers the net asset value of tangible and intangible assets of the
595 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 649 So. 2d 392 (La. 1995), the value
of the community interest of fifty percent of the stock of a law corporation was
fixed at twenty-two percent, the percentage of the net income the husband
historically received from the corporation, rejecting a valuation based upon fifty
percent of the net assets. In Head v. Head, 714 So. 2d 231, 235 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1998), the court used a capitalization of income approach in valuing a
business. A number of additions were made to net cash flow for "perks" and
personal expenses paid by the business, and the adjusted net cash flow was
capitalized at a capitalization rate of twenty-five percent, to arrive at the value of
the business. Id. at 235. In Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381, 1384-85 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1993), the value of a community corporation was determined by
taking the average of the value derived by using five different valuation
methods: book value, economic net worth, capitalization of earnings,
capitalization of cash flow, and price earnings ratio.
168. The purpose of this article is not to present a detailed explanation of
each of these approaches to value, or methods for valuing, a business. Its
purpose is to simply alert the reader to the existence of these other approaches to
value. The reader can discuss with the forensic expert the applicability and
appropriateness of one or more of these approaches to value in a particular
situation.
More complete discussions of evaluation methods for businesses may be
found elsewhere. See, e.g., Charlotte K. Goldberg, Value and Volatility: The
New Economy and Valuing Businesses at Divorce, 35 FAM. L.Q. 451 (2001);
Joy E. Fishman & Bonnie O'Rourke, Value: More than a Superficial
Understanding is Required, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 315 (1998);
Gregory J. Cowley, Putting a Price Tag on the Company, 17 FAM. ADvOC. 44
(1995); Wallace F. Forbes, Putting a Value on a Closely Held Corporation, 7
FAM. ADvoc. 28 (1984); Mark W. Shirley, Business Valuation Issues, presented
at 4th Annual Family Law Seminar, LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
September 8-9, 2000 (discussion of valuation theories and methods applicable
to businesses). Also, an entire issue of the Family Advocate, published by the
Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, is devoted to valuation
issues in divorce cases, including a discussion of approaches to business
valuation. See generally 25 FAM. ADvOC. (2003).
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business. 169 This approach is a more appropriate one for a business
with significant tangible assets.
170
The two income aproaches are capitalization of earnings and
discounted cash flow. The former produces a single measure of
investment return by taking a retrospective look at earnings and
capitalizing those earnings at a chosen capitalization rate. 172 In
contrast to this method, the discounted cash flow method is
prospective. 173  The appraiser projects future earnings and then
discounts them to present value. _'4
The market approach encompasses several methods:
comparable companies, actual sales, and industry formulas.1
75
A hybrid method with characteristics of both the asset-based
approach and the market approach is the capitalization of excess
earnings method. 176 This method requires an appraisal based upon
a reasonable return on tangible assets.' 77  The remaining or
"excess" earnings of the business are deemed goodwill or
intangible value, which is then capitalized.'
78
Investment value is value to a particular investor based on his
individual investment requirements, as distinguished from market
169. Joanne Ross Wilder, Cross-Examining the Financial Expert, 25 FAM.
ADvoc. 43, 47 (2003).
170. Id.
171. Id. The court in Head apparently used a combination of these
approaches. 714 So. 2d at 234-36. After noting that the most appropriate
approach to value the corporate stock was capitalization of earnings, the experts
calculated "the net cash flow" of the corporation, capitalized the net cash flow at
twenty-five percent, and added back in certain "perks" and other fringe benefits
received by the spouses from the corporation. Id.




176. Id. at 48.
177. Id.
178. Id. In Schiro v. Schiro, 839 So. 2d 304, 308-09 (La. App. 5th Cir.
2003), one of the experts valuing a community interest in a corporation used a
capitalized excess earnings method of determining the value of the corporation,
while another expert used adjusted book value. See generally Barry S. Sziklay,




value, which is impersonal and detached. 179 Market value has been
called the value of the marketplace and does not assume any
particular buyer or seller.180 Investment value is the specific value
to a particular investor or class of investors for individual
investment reasons.' 81 For example, a business may have a higher
value to one potential buyer than to the public generally if that
business has synergism with a company already owned by him.
182
Intrinsic value is used primarily in determining the value of
stock and other securities. 18 It represents an analytical judgment
of value based upon the perceived characteristics inherent in the
investment, not tempered by the value to any one investor (as in
investment value) or the market generally (as in market value), but
by how these characteristics are perceived by the analyst.'
84
Intrinsic value is determined by a rigorous or fundamental analysis
of the company's assets, earning power, dividends, capital
structure, management quality, and other factors. 8 5 The goal is to
determine the "true" or "real" worth of the stock, whether or not
that is reflected in market price.'
8 6
Freely traded value is the price at which a closely held
company's stock should or would trade if it were publicly
179. The court in Ellington v. Ellington, 842 So. 2d 1160, 1168-69 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1269 (La. 2003), referred to this approach to
valuation:
The court is not aware of either statutory or jurisprudential law
prohibiting courts from recognizing that a community business can
have different values depending upon which spouse acquires it.
In the instant case, the trial court determined that the value it placed on
NECC was dependent upon which spouse would receive the business.
The record, particularly the testimony of the parties and their sons, as
well as their respective expert witnesses, supports this conclusion.
180. Fishman & O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 318; Cowley, supra note 168,
at 29.
181. Sziklay, supra note 178, at 6; Fishman & O'Rourke, supra note 168, at
320; Cowley, supra note 168, at 25.
182. Fishman & O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 320.
183. Sziklay, supra note 178, at 8; Cowley, supra note 168, at 30.
184. Cowley, supra note 168, at 30.
185. Sziklay, supra note 178, at 8.
186. Cowley, supra note 168, at 30.
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owned. 187 The valuator analyzes publicly held companies that are
in a business similar to that of the closely held company being
valued or which sell to or buy from similar customers. 8 Making
appropriate adjustments for size and other factors, the analyst
derives his freely traded value figure for the closely held
company. 
89
V. MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Bel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. involved a
claim under a Personal Liability Umbrella Policy ("PLUP") with a
$1,000,000 limit of liability.' 90  The underlying automobile
liability insurance policy had 100/300 coverage as well as 100/300
uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") coverage. The PLUP
was issued to the wife, who was the only person listed on the
declarations page as the named insured. However, the husband
had executed a waiver rejecting UM coverage under the PLUP on
all vehicles they owned. The husband was killed in an automobile
accident involving an uninsured/underinsured motorist. The wife
187. Forbes, supra note 168, at 30.
188. Id.
189. Id. Sziklay, supra note 178, at 9, proposes a new standard of value-a
standard of value not necessarily based on transferability---called "Divorce
Value," which he describes as an amalgamation of various standards of value:
fair-market value, investment value, intrinsic value, and fair value (the value of
the stock of a dissenting shareholder) He defines Divorce Value as follows:
Divorce value is the standard of value to be used in valuing ownership
interests in privately-held businesses in matrimonial-dissolution
matters. It represents the value of a business ownership interest to a
marital estate for the sole purpose of enabling a family court to
equitably distribute, in whole or in part, the value of the business-
ownership interest as an asset of the marital estate. It does not
necessarily represent a value for purpose of exchange as does fair-
market value, investment value, intrinsic or fundamental value, or fair
value.
Divorce value may ignore or consider the effects of valuation
adjustments, such as discounts and premiums, that would otherwise be
taken into consideration in light of the facts of the case, applicable
laws, and cases in the particular state of the ongoing litigation.
Id.




sued the PLUP insurer for damages to herself and their children.
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(ii) at that
time provided that the UM rejection (waiver) may be "signed by
the named insured or his legal representative." 9 1 The policy
provided, in the definitions, that "named insured" also includes a
spouse who resides in the same household as the person listed as
the named insured on the declarations page, a standard
provision. 192 Therefore, the court concluded that the husband was
authorized to execute the rejection of UM coverage under the
Insurance Code.' 93 Concluding that "the community property laws
govern Douglas Bel's ability to reject UM coverage, despite the
language contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i)," the court also examined whether he was
authorized to execute the rejection of UM coverage under the
Matrimonial Regimes Act. 194 The court held that the policy was
community property because community funds were used to
purchase the policy, citing Louisiana Civil Code article 2338. 95
The court quoted the equal management provisions of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2346196 and concluded that since:
there are no applicable exceptions in law to this codal
provision, the community property laws clearly provide...
that either spouse can take action to dispose of or manage
community property [and the husband] had the
191. Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 22:1406D was redesignated as
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 22:680 by 2003 La. Acts No. 456, § 3.
Section 22:680(1)(a)(ii) provides that the rejection, selection of lower limits, or
selection of economic-only coverage shall be made only on a prescribed form
which is "signed by the named insured or his legal representative." LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:680(1)(a)(ii) (2004).
192. Bel, 845 So. 2d at 462.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 463.
195. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2006) (classifying as
community property any property acquired during the existence .of the legal
regime with community things).
196. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2006) (each spouse acting alone may
manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided
by law).
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authority to reject/dispose of UM coverage in accordance
with Louisiana Civil Code art. 2346.197
The court correctly noted that the joint concurrence provisions
of article 2347 were not applicable. 198 Curiously, there is no
mention of the exclusive management provision of article 2351,
which provides that "[a] spouse has the exclusive right to manage,
alienate, encumber, or lease movables issued or registered in his
name as provided by law."' 99 Louisiana Revised Statutes Section
22:624, a provision of the Insurance Code, sets forth the required
contents of all types of insurance policies issued in Louisiana and
provides, in part:
A. The written instrument, in which a contract of insurance
is set forth, is the policy.
B. A policy shall specify:
(1) The names of the parties to the contract .... 2 0
The court noted, "only Mary Bel is listed on the declaration
page as the named insured. 2 0' The policy was "issued ... in [her]
name as provided by law. 20 2  It appears that Mrs. Bel had
exclusive management rights to the community policy and that Mr.
Bel's rejection of UM coverage was invalid, unless the provision
of the Insurance Code, as interpreted by the court, controls over the
management provisions of the Matrimonial Regimes Act.2 °3
VI. CONCURRENCE
Holland v. Barrios reflects a misunderstanding both as to the
nature of the concurrence required of spouses in certain acts of
197. Bel, 845 So. 2d at 463.
198. Id. at 463 n.5.
199. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2351 (2006).
200. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:624 (2004).
201. Bel, 845 So. 2d at 463 n.2.
202. Id. at 463.
203. The wife claimed that the quoted portion of the Insurance Code that
allowed any named insured to reject UM coverage and have that waiver bind
any other insured under the policy was unconstitutional. Id. However, the court
did not pass on the constitutionality of Section 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) for the
assigned reason that "we find that.., the community property laws govern [the
husband's] ability to reject UM coverage under the PLUP .... " Id.
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management of community property and the result of lack of
concurrence when concurrence is required.204 The husband
executed an agreement to sell a community immovable to a third
party; his wife signed as a witness.20 5 They subsequently donated
the immovable to their children. 0 6 The third party sought specific
performance of the agreement to sell and the nullity of the
donation.2 0 7 The Barrios' children asserted that the agreement to
sell was a nullity because the wife did not sign the agreement as an
owner, but only as a witness. 20 8  They contended that the
agreement was an absolute nullity and could not be "ratified" by
the wife.20 9 Without questioning these contentions, the court of
appeal concluded that since the wife "did not sign the document as
a party, but merely as a witness, . . . the agreement is
unenforceable because it purports to alienate, encumber or lease
community property based on Mr. Barrios' signature alone."
210
204. 892 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004).





210. Id. at 680. This article pretermits the issue of whether a contract to buy
and sell an immovable creates real rights and real obligations and thus
constitutes an alienation or encumbrance of the immovable. See A.N.
Yiannopoulos, PROPERTY § 235, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 475-76
(4th ed. 2001 & Supp. 2005). This issue was neither raised nor decided in
Holland v. Barrios.
Not all agreements involving community immovable property require the
concurrence of both spouses.
Cabibi & Cabibi v. Hatheway, 570 So. 2d 104, 110 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990),
writ denied, 572 So. 2d 91 (La. 1991), was a case involving an attorney/client
agreement signed only by the husband, in which the wife contended that she was
not responsible for the attorney fees because she did not give her husband
permission to sign the contract. The lawsuit filed pursuant to the attorney/client
agreement sought the recission of the sale of immovable property acquired as
community property. Id. The court rejected the wife's contention:
Furthermore, we reject Bertucci's argument that Civil Code Article
2347 is applicable. That article requires the signatures of both spouses
when the alienation, encumbrance or lease of an immovable is
involved. The contract with Cabibi was an employment contract for his
representation in a lawsuit for damages. Although recission of the sale
was an element of the damages sought, we do not consider that fact as
2006]
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The concurrence requirements of the Matrimonial Regimes Act do
not mandate that both spouses be parties to the act of alienation,
encumbrance, or lease. They require, in the stipulated instances,
the concurrence of both spouses for certain acts of management of
community property.21' If a spouse sells a community immovable,
the other spouse is not required also to be a vendor of the
community immovable. If a spouse mortgages a community
immovable, the other spouse is not required also to be a mortgagor
of the community immovable. The other spouse is not required to
be "a party to the contract," as. stated by Holland.212 The other
spouse is simply required to concur in the transaction. 213  The
codal articles do not specify any required form for that
concurrence. However, the concurrence of a spouse is a juridical
act.214 Therefore, it appears that there should be some action on
the part of a spouse that expresses consent.
A review of the prior Louisiana Civil Code article and the
debate resulting from the proposed adoption of the concurrence
rules confirm this view.
requiring the spouse's signature on the employment agreement.
Furthermore, when the real property was transferred as part of the
settlement with Mobil, Bertucci did sign the act of sale.
Id.
In Cajun Capital, Inc. v. Bourque, 532 So. 2d 272, 273 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988), the husband signed a listing agreement with a realtor granting the realtor
the exclusive right to sell a community enterprise, a flower and gift shop. The
Bourques contended that the listing agreement was a nullity because the wife did
not concur pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2347, which requires the
concurrence of both spouses for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of all or
substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise. Id. The court held that
the listing agreement did not create a real obligation under Louisiana Civil Code
article 1763 with respect to the community enterprise and thus did not require
the concurrence of the wife. Id. at 274.
211. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2347-49, 2353 (2006).
212. Holland, 892 So. 2d at 679. The court held the agreement to be
unenforceable because the wife "did not sign the document as a party, but
merely as a witness." Id. at 680.
213. To concur means to agree or to consent. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
309 (8th ed. 2004).
214. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 cmt. (c) (2006).
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With limited exceptions, under the prior law, the husband, as
head and master of the partnership or community of gains, could
administer its effects, dispose of the revenues which they
produced, and alienate them by onerous title, without the consent
of his wife.215 Louisiana Civil Code article 2334 of the Civil Code
of 1870, as amended by 1962 Louisiana Acts Number 353,
contained the following restrictions on the authority of the husband
to lease, mortgage, or sell immovable community property:
Common property is that which is acquired by the
husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different
from that above declared. But when the title to community
property stands in the name of the wife, it cannot be
mortgaged or sold by the husband without her written
authority or consent.
Where the title to immovable property stands in the names
of both the husband and wife, it may not be leased,
mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife's
written authority or consent where she has made a
declaration by authentic act that her authority and consent
are required for such lease, sale or mortgage and has filed
such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of
the parish in which the property is situated.2
16
Under this article, the wife was not required to be a vendor,
mortgagor, or a lessor of the community immovable. If
community property stood in the name of the wife, the husband
could sell or mortgage it, but only with the wife's "written
authority or consent.' 217 If title to community immovable property
stood in the names of both spouses, the husband could lease,
mortgage, or sell it, requiring "the wife's written authority or
consent" only if she had filed the described declaration in the
mortgage and conveyance records of the parish in which the
property was located. In neither case was the wife required to be a
party to the transaction; she had to give her "written authority or
215. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No.
709, § 1.





consent" to her husband's act in leasing, selling, or mortgaging the
community immovable.
The proposal to adopt the concurrence language in the 1978
and 1979 revisions of the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing
community property evoked considerable commentary.
Although commentators agreed that neither the written authority
nor consent required under the .old law nor the concurrence
requirements of the proposed law made a spouse a party to a
transaction or imposed personal liability on that spouse whose
consent or concurrence was required for certain transactions, those
commentators expressed concern that the wife might be required,
as a practical matter, to become a party, or a principal, to the
transaction and thus incur personal liability arising from the
transaction. 219 This result would negate the protection afforded to
218. See George L. Bilbe, Management of Community Assets Under Act 627,
39 LA. L. REv. 414 (1979), and W.T. Tete, A Critique of the Equal Management
Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REv. 491 (1979) (both discussing 1978 La. Acts No. 627,
repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1). The concurrence requirements in both
acts are substantially the same, although the structure and some of the language
is different.
219. See Bilbe supra note 218, at 418-19. Bilbe correctly explains:
[T]he requirement of concurrence for alienation, encumbrance or lease
of community immovables will result in frequent demands that wives
express their concurrence by personally committing themselves as
parties to these transactions. Because many creditors are only too
happy to obtain the commitment of an additional party, it is particularly
important to emphasize that a spouse can satisfy [the] concurrence
requirement without incurring personal responsibility.
[T]he entitlement of a contracting party to the personal responsibility of
both spouses depends upon the agreement he has entered into. For
example, a married man who signs a contract to sell immovable
property incurs a personal responsibility to the buyer. However, if his
wife is not a party to this agreement, she incurs no personal
responsibility whatsoever. Thus, if she is willing to sign a formal
document consenting to her husband's conveyance of the property, he,
if his title is otherwise merchantable, is in a position to fulfill his
contractual commitment, and the purchaser who has not bargained for
the wife's participation as a vendor should have no basis for complaint.
If, on the other hand, a purchaser in a contract to sell obtains the
signatures of both spouses as parties to the transaction, he is entitled to
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the wife under the prior law.22 ° Underlying these concerns was the
recognition that the written authority or consent requirement under
the prior law and the concurrence requirement under the present
law do not make a spouse a party to the transaction, and that a
spouse does not incur liability for the obligations arising out of the
transaction as the result of his or her consent or concurrence to the
transaction.221 The requirements of written consent of the wife
under prior law and concurrence of the spouses under present law,
in certain types of transactions involving enumerated classes of
community property, were imposed because of the importance of
these types of property and the transactions involving them to the
well-being of the family. It might have been better had the
legislature prescribed the form in which that concurrence must be
expressed in the new legislation, as it did in the prior law,
especially with reference to the alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of community immovables. However, to permit the granting of
concurrence in any manner in which the giving of consent is
recognized by the law was a legitimate legislative choice.
The jurisprudence does not provide any definitive guidelines as
to what action or inaction constitutes concurrence. In South
Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Eisman, the husband executed a
written servitude agreement on community property; the wife did
not sign the agreement.222 The appellate court affirmed the factual
findings of the trial court that the wife neither gave her consent nor
"that her actions comprised a ratification." 223
In Perkins v. B & W Contractors, Inc., at issue was whether the
concurrence of the wife was required for the husband to agree to
the amendment of restrictive covenants affecting community
demand that both execute the act of sale as vendors because of the
contractual commitments he has obtained.
Id. See also Tete, supra note 218, at 505.
220. Tete, supra note 218, at 494.
221. See Bilbe, supra note 218, at 418.
222. 430 So. 2d 256, 257 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 437 So. 2d 1154
(La. 1983).
223. Id. at 259.
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immovable property. 224 The court held, assuming that the signing
of the amendments fell within the purview of article 2347, 225 that
the lack of concurrence creates only a relative nullity,226 that the
wife "has not objected to the voting of her interest in those lots in
favor of the amendment," and that the amendments were valid.227
Louisiana Civil Code article 2031 provides that relative nullity
may be invoked only by those persons for whose interest the
ground for nullity was established, which, in this case, was the
wife.228 The suit was between other owners of subdivision lots;
neither the husband nor the wife were parties to the suit.
229
In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n of Warner Robins,
Georgia v. Delta Towers, Ltd., the issue was whether the
concurrence of the wife was required in the subordination by the
husband of community "in rem" mortgage notes and a vendor's
lien and mortgage, which the court classified as immovables.
230
The court held that the subordination was an alienation of
community immovables and that the wife's concurrence was
required.23 1 However, the court found that the wife had renounced
her right to concur by her intervention in the original Act of Credit
Sale and later Act of Modification of the vendor's lien and
mortgage and of the three promissory notes, although she did not
intervene in the Act of Subordination.
232
This renunciation of the right of concurrence by the actions of
the wife described by the court presents problems. Louisiana Civil
Code article 2348 provides that a spouse "may expressly renounce
the right to concur" in those instances when the concurrence of a
spouse is required.233 This article provides that the renunciation
224. 439 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 652 (La.
1983).
225. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2006).
226. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2006).
227. Perkins, 439 So. 2d at 656.
228. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2031 (2006).
229. Perkins, 439 So. 2d at 653.
230. 544 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 548 So. 2d 1250 (La.
1989).
231. Id. at 1343.
232. Id.
233. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2348 (2006).
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must be express, not implied by some other action or inaction. 234
"Express" means clearly and unmistakably communicated and
directly stated.235  The word is usually contrasted with
"implied.1236 The careful listing in the article of the types or
classes of property and the transactions that may be the object of
the waiver of concurrence indicates that there must be an
intentional renunciation of the right to concur with respect to these
enumerated things and acts, not a renunciation that is implied by
some action or inaction.
The court further held, even assuming that concurrence of the
wife in the subordination was required and that there was no
concurrence, that the wife "ratified" the subordination by signing
joint tax returns for the year of the subordination and taking
advantage of substantial tax benefits attributable to the
subordination. 2
37
In Kee v. Francis Camel Construction, the husband granted a
238right of way over community property to the state. The wife
signed as a witness, not a party.2 39 Both sought damages to the
community property caused by a contractor for the state working
on the right of way.240 They contended that the right of way
agreement was null and void because it was executed only by the
husband.241 The court found that signing as a witness to the right
of way agreement, being aware of the work to be done, not
objecting to it or objecting to her husband signing the agreement,
constituted a "ratification" by the wife of the right of way
agreement.
242
In Tri-State Bank & Trust v. Moore, the wife did not sign a
collateral mortgage on community immovable property executed
by her husband. 243 However, she later joined in the execution of a
234. Id.
235. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
236. See id
237. First Fed Sav. & Loan, 544 So. 2d at 1344.





243. 609 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
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deed of the same property, in which the sole consideration was
recited to be the mortgage executed by her husband. The court





In French Market Homestead, FSA v. Huddleston, the husband
and wife signed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on
community immovable property.245 In foreclosure proceedings,
the creditor obtained a judgment against the husband and executed
on it under a writ offierifacias.24 6 The wife sought to enjoin the
judicial sale of the property, claiming that her concurrence was
required to sell the property.2 4 7 The court held that by executing
the mortgage on the community immovable, the wife concurred in
the encumbrance of the property, and that a natural consequence of
that encumbrance was the seizure and sale of the community
immovable to satisfy the community obligation.248 With respect to
the judicial mortgage resulting from the judgment, the court held
that an encumbrance imposed by law is not subject to the
249concurrence requirement of a spouse.
The use of the concept of ratification to cure a relative nullity
in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community property
because of a lack of concurrence of the other spouse, when such
concurrence is required, reflects a conceptual problem in the
jurisprudence. 250
A matrimonial regime is a system of principles and rules
governing the ownership and management of the property of
244. Id. at 1093.
245. 579 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 586 So. 2d 559
(La. 1991).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1081.
248. Id. at 1082.
249. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 cmt. (a) (2006).
250. See Tri-State Bank & Trust v. Moore, 609 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1992); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Warner Robins, Georgia v. Delta
Towers, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 548 So. 2d 1250
(La. 1989); Kee v. Francis Camel Constr., 532 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Eisman, 430 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 437 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1983).
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married persons as between themselves and toward third
persons.25
One of the rules of the legal regime is that each spouse owns a
present undivided one-half interest in the community property.
252
However, the ownership interest of the spouses in community
property is subject to the management rules identified in articles
2346 through 2355. 1.253 Generally, either spouse may, acting
alone, manage, control, or dispose of community property. 24 This
equal management right includes the one-half interest that a spouse
owns and the one-half interest owned by the other spouse.255 The
ownership right of each spouse is subject to the management right
of the other spouse, including the right to alienate, encumber, or
lease the community thing, unless concurrence of the other spouse
is required by law. 56 In exercising these management rights, a
spouse does not act as mandatary of the other spouse with respect
to the other spouse's ownership interest in the community thing.
257
Therefore, this system of rules grants to one spouse the right to
lease, alienate, or encumber the property interest of the other
spouse in the thing owned by them equally as community
property.258
There are two modifications to this general rule of equal
management. The first modification is the concurrence
requirement for certain acts of management with respect to certain
designated types of community property.259  The second
modification is the granting of exclusive management rights in a
specified spouse with respect to certain designated types of
251. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325 (2006). A matrimonial regime may be
legal, contractual, or partly legal and partly contractual, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2326 (2006), or a regime of separation of property, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2370 (2006). The legal regime is the community of acquets and gains
established in Chapter 2 of Title VI, Book III, of the Louisiana Civil Code. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2327 (2006).
252. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2006).
253. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2346-55.1 (2006).
254. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2006).
255. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (d) (2006).
256. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2006).
257. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (d) (2006).
258. Id.
259. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2347, 2349 (2006).
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community property. 26° Neither of these modifications derogates
from the principle that one spouse manages, alienates, encumbers,
or leases community property; nowhere is there a rule that both
spouses must manage, alienate, or encumber community property
during the existence of the legal regime.26' In certain instances,
one spouse must have the concurrence, or consent, of the other
spouse to act; but in those cases, the other spouse whose
concurrence is required is not considered a lessor, vendor, donor,
or mortgagor of the community thing. 262  Nor is a spouse the
mandatary of the spouse whose concurrence, or consent, is
required.26
Louisiana Civil Code article 2353 provides that an act with
reference to community property entered into by a spouse without
the concurrence of the other spouse when such concurrence is
required is a relative nullity. Ratification is not the proper
juridical act to cure the relative nullity resulting from the lack of
concurrence when concurrence is required. Confirmation is the
proper juridical act.
Ratification is a declaration whereby a person gives his consent
to an obligation incurred on his behalf by another person without265 266
authority.265 Ratification may be express or tacit. On the other
hand, confirmation is a declaration whereby a person cures the
relative nullity of an obligation.267 Confirmation may also be
express or tacit.
268
260. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2350-52 (2006).
261. See Bilbe, supra note 218, at 418; Tete, supra note 218, at 500.
262. See generally LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2346-55 (2006) (articles
governing the management of community property).
263. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (d) (2006).
264. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2006).
265. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1843 (2006).
266. Tacit means "done or made in silence; implied or indicated, but not
actually expressed... arising without express contract or agreement." Goree v.
Midstates Oil Corp., 18 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1944). Tacit ratification results
when a person, with knowledge of an obligation incurred on his behalf by
another, accepts the benefit of that obligation. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1843
(2006).




The Exposd des Motifs of the Projet of Titles III and IV of
Book III of the Civil Code of Louisiana explains the differences
between "confirmation" and "ratification":
Articles 1842 through 1845 of the revision clarify the law
pertaining to confirmation and ratification. Civil Code
Article 2272 (1870) spoke of "confirmation or ratification"
in a manner that suggested that the two terms were
synonymous. The same ambiguity was present in the
French original. For that reason, Louisiana courts often
spoke of "ratification" when what was truly involved was
an act of "confirmation." A person "confirms" a defective
act that he himself made. A person "ratifies" an act made
on his behalf by another who did not have authority to do
so. That distinction was very clear to Toullier. Toullier
asserted that the requirements of the French counterpart to
Civil Code Article 2272 (1870) did not apply to a
ratification. To that effect he cited a decision of the Cour
de cassation of December 26, 1815, reported in Sirey,
1816.2.243, in which that court reversed a decision of the
court of the city of Nimes, and held that "ratification" is
governed by Article 1998 of the Code Napoleon, (which is
equivalent to Civil Code Article 3021 (1870)), where no
such requirements are prescribed.
Accordingly, Article 1842 of the revision defines
"confirmation" essentially as a declaration whereby a
person cures the relative nullity of an obligation. The
declaration may be implied from voluntary performance,
which, in such a case, amounts to a tacit confirmation. A
"ratification" is a declaration by which a person gives his
consent to an obligation incurred on his behalf by another
without authority. Such a declaration may be implied when
the person accepts the benefit of the obligation with
knowledge that the obligation has been incurred on his
behalf by another. The effects of acts of confirmation and
ratification are retroactive to the date of the obligation, but
2006]
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the confirmation or ratification may not impair the rights of
third persons.269
As noted in the Exposd des Motifs, a person "confirms" a
defective act, a relatively null contract, that he made himself. If a
party to a contract did not give free consent at the time the contract
was made, it is relatively null. 270 A contract that is only relatively
null may be confirmed.27' Article 2353 declares that the
alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community property by a
spouse is relatively null when the concurrence of the other spouse
is required by law, unless the other spouse has renounced the right
272to concur.
On the other hand, a person "ratifies" an act made on his behalf
by another person who did not have authority to do so.2 7 3 When a
spouse acts without concurrence when concurrence is required, he
is not performing an act on behalf of the other spouse without
authority to do so. He is acting on his own behalf in alienating,
encumbering, or leasing community property. His spouse is not a
party to that transaction. Therefore, ratification is not the proper
juridical act to cure the relative nullity resulting from lack of
concurrence; confirmation is.
As has been pointed out, under pre-1980 law, only the
husband, as head and master of the community, could incur a
274
community obligation. The wife had neither express nor
implied authority to alienate or encumber community property or
to bind the community.275 The husband was liable for the act of
the wife only if she acted as an agent for the community2 76 or the
269. Expose' des Motifs of the Projet of Titles II1 and IV of Book II1 of the
Civil Code of Louisiana, 6 WEST'S LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ANNOTATED 24
(1987).
270. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2031 (2006).
271. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1842 (2006).
272. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2006).
273. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1843 (2006).
274. See cases cited infra notes 275-78.
275. Ducasse v. Modica, 69 So. 2d 358 (La. 1953); Thomas v. Winsey, 76
So. 2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Liberal Fin. Corp. v. Washington, 62 So. 2d
545 (La. App. Orl. 1953).
276. Alphonse Brenner Co. v. Phillips, 338 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976); Watson v. Veuleman, 260 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). See also
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obligation was ratified by the husband.277  Because she had no
authority to bind the husband as head and master of the
community, yet purported to do so, it was proper to say that the
278husband ratified her actions.
A case in which ratification was properly used is Frazier v.
Harper.279  After a divorce and resulting termination of the
community, the husband agreed to the extinguishment of a
community interest in a Delta Airlines pension plan and the
substitution of an interest in a new pension plan.280 The case was
decided prior to the enactment of the special rules governing the
management of former community property.281 Therefore, upon
the termination of the community, the former spouses became
ordinary co-owners of the community pension benefits accrued as
a result of his employment during their community.28 2  Under
those co-ownership rules, although the husband could alienate or
encumber his share of the pension rights held in indivision without
the consent of his co-owner former wife, he could not alienate or
encumber the interest of his co-owner former wife without her
consent.283 He did not have her consent to alienate her interest in
Am. Nat'l Bank of Beaumont v. Rathbum, 264 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972).
277. McCary's Shreve City Jewelers, Inc. v. Saucier, 318 So. 2d 671 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1975).
278. Id. at 673. See also Clarence J. Morrow, Matrimonial Property in
Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3, 36 n.186 (1959).
279. 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992).
280. Id. at 60.
281. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.1 (1994), amended by 1995 La. Acts No.
433, § 1 (providing seven special rules for the management of former
community property until a partition, or the death or judgment of declaration of
death of a spouse, when the community property regime terminated for a cause
other than the death or judgment of declaration of death of a spouse). See also
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2369.2-69.8 (2006).
282. Louisiana Civil Code article 2369.1, prior to its amendment, provided:
"After termination of the community property regime, the provisions governing
co-ownership apply unless there is contrary provision of law or juridical act."
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.1 (1994), amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 433, § 1.
The provisions governing co-ownership added by 1990 La. Acts No. 990, § 1
are contained in Louisiana Civil Code articles 797-818.
283. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 805 (2006).
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the old pension plan and substitute it with an interest in the new
pension plan.28 4 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
her action in instituting suit for recognition of her interest in the
substituted pension plan constituted her ratification of the
unauthorized action of her husband in extinguishing her rights
under the old pension plan and substituting a new pension plan.
285
Although not without conceptual difficulty,286 the better practice in
these cases involving acts by a spouse without concurrence when
concurrence is required is to use the concept of confirmation.
Confirmation is the proper concept since article 2353 declares the
transaction to be a relative nullity 8 7 and article 2031 declares that
the proper method to cure a relative nullity is by confirmation. 
288
VII. REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
Louisiana Civil Code article 2365 authorizes reimbursement to
a spouse who has used his separate property to satisfy a
community obligation.289  However, the third,29 fourth,2 9' and
284. Frazier, 600 So. 2d at 62.
285. Id. See also Garrett v. Walker, 407 So. 2d 1309, 1312-13 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981), decided under prior law, in which the husband was held to have
ratified the imposition of a mortgage imposed on property by the wife when she
purchased it. The court found the property to be community property. Id. at
1313. The husband ratified the act of the wife by suing to have the property
decreed to be community property and thus seeking by the suit to claim the
benefit of the purchase of the property by the wife. Id. A husband at that time
was not liable for a debt solely contracted by his wife unless the husband ratified
the indebtedness. See McCary's Shreve City Jewelers, Inc. v. Saucier, 318 So.
2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
286. The Exposd des Motifs states that a person "confirms" a defective act
that he himself made. See supra note 269. However, when a spouse acts
without concurrence when concurrence is required, he may not cure the nullity
himself by confirming the act; only the other spouse, whose concurrence was
required but not obtained, can confirm it.
287. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2006).
288. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2031 (2006).
289. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 (2006). The reimbursement claims of
spouses in a legal regime are subject to a ten year prescription commencing
upon termination of the community. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 915 So. 2d 966, 970
(La. App. 3d Cir. 2005).
290. Gautreau v. Gautreau, 697 So. 2d 1339 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
703 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1997); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 693 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 3d
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fifth 292 circuits have created a jurisprudential exception to this
statutory reimbursement rule. 293 The genesis of this exception was
the fifth circuit case of Gachez v. Gachez.294 In Gachez, the court
denied the husband's reimbursement claim for the car notes he
paid with his separate funds on a community automobile while he
was using it after the divorce. 295 Noting -that automobiles tend to
depreciate in value over a period of time and concluding that the
use of a vehicle is directly related to its depreciation, the court
invoked equity as the basis for denying reimbursement. 296 The
fourth circuit adopted the Gachez rationale in Davezac v.
Davezac.
297
Conversely, the first circuit in Williams v. Williams, observing
that the fourth and fifth circuits had chosen to treat reimbursement
from separate property differently depending on whether the debt
paid was on movable or immovable property, correctly noted that
Louisiana Civil Code article 2365 "makes no such distinction.
'2 98
The second circuit in Chance v. Chance concurred in the Williams
court's assessment of article 2365: "Apparently, our colleagues of
the third, fourth, and fifth circuits have elected to treat such
reimbursement claims differently, depending upon whether the
Cir. 1997); Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied,
649 So. 2d 392 (La. 1995).
291. Guillaume v. Guillaume, 603 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992);
Meyer v. Meyer, 553 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Davezac v. Davezac,
483 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
292. Dillenkoffer v. Dillenkoffer, 492 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 494 So. 2d 333 (La. 1986); Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d 166 (La. 1984).
293. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 500, for a criticism of these cases. See
also Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes, supra note 21, at 421, for the same criticism
of Stewart v. Stewart, 728 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), writ denied, 740
So. 2d 114 (La. 1999), in which the court denied a reimbursement claim for
maintenance expenses of an automobile used by the claimant spouse. The writer
suggested an alternate analysis consistent with the Civil Code articles Id.
294. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608.
295. Id. at 614.
296. Id.
297. 483 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
298. 509 So. 2d 77, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds
by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:374 (2006).
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mortgage payments pertain to movable or immovable property.
Even so, we concur with the first circuit that La. C.C. art. 2365
makes no such distinction. 299
However, in Gill v. Gill, the second circuit, without mentioning
Chance, adopted the reasoning of the third, fourth, and fifth
circuits when it disallowed an article 2365 reimbursement claim
because of the rapid depreciation of automobiles. 30 0 Agreeing with
the reasoning of these courts, the second circuit stated that the "car
note payments by the spouse using the vehicle are considered as
payment for the depreciation caused by such use."
30 1
Nevertheless, the court neglected to consider that the major factor
in automobile depreciation, or the reduction in the automobile's
market value, is the introduction of new models rather than the use
of the automobile. A new automobile's market value immediately
decreases once it is purchased and driven off of the dealer's lot.
This immediate decrease in value is not primarily due to the
mileage that the car has been driven. More importantly, however,
this rule violates the major premise of all but one of the
reimbursement rules of the community regime because it is
contrary to the plain language of these articles.30 2 Prior to the
adoption of the Matrimonial Regimes Act, the measure of
reimbursement in all cases was one-half of the enhanced value of
the community or separate property benefited by the expenditure
of money or labor.30 3  In the revision, this measure of
299. 694 So. 2d 613, 616 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997), overruled by Mason v.
Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
300. 895 So. 2d 807, 818 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000).
301. Id.
302. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2364-67.2 (2006).
303. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2408 (1870), repealed by 1970 La. Acts No.
709, § 1. Former article 2408 provided:
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been
increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or
her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the
increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or
ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses or industry;
but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due
only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of
property, or to the chances of trade.
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reimbursement was changed to one-half of the value of the
separate or community thing used for all articles except for article
2368.304 No provision for charging a spouse for the depreciation
occasioned by that spouse's use of the former community property,
now co-owned property, may be found in the revised
reimbursement articles or the co-ownership articles.305 Co-owners
of property ordinarily do not owe rent to each other for the use of
co-owned property. °6  Nor should they be charged with the
depreciation of the co-owned property.
This issue has had an interesting history in the third circuit. In
Preis v. Preis, the third circuit adopted the fourth and fifth circuits'
rule disallowing reimbursement for mortgage payments on a
depreciable automobile when the claimant spouse had the
exclusive use of the movable during the period the payments were
made.30 7 That rule was extended to reimbursement for telephone
equipment in Jurgelskey v. Pivac30 8 and reaffirmed in Bergeron v.
Bergeron.30 9  In the latter case, Judge Woodard questioned the
validity of this interpretation of article 2365, stating that it departed
"from the plain language of Article 2365" and that "Article 2365
does not make a distinction between movable and immovable
property." 310 Judge Woodard is correct. Writing for the court in
Nash v. Nash, Judge Woodard wrote that Preis and Bergeron "are
inconsistent with our interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code art.
304. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2364-67.2 (2006). See also LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2366 cmt. (b) (2006).
305. In denying reimbursement for the payment of mortgage notes on a
depreciable asset when the spouse seeking reimbursement had the use of the
asset during the period of time when the payments were made, the second circuit
stated, "The car note payments by the spouse using the vehicle are considered as
payment for the depreciation caused by such use." Gill, 895 So. 2d at 818.
306. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 701 So. 2d 1280, 1287 (La. 1997); Young v.
Smith, 715 So. 2d 479, 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
307. 649 So. 2d 593, 596-97 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 649 So.
2d 392 (La. 1995). See the cases cited supra notes 291-92 for a discussion of
the rule in the fourth and fifth circuits.
308. 614 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
309. 693 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
310. Id. at 203.
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2365 and we decline to follow them."31 1 However, in Sheridon v.
Sheridon, an en banc decision, the third circuit overruled Nash.
312
The significance and far-reaching effect of the court's decision
in Sheridon cannot be overemphasized. The court reinstated its
depreciable movable rule of Preis and Bergeron.313 However, it
went much further. It held that the reimbursement claim under
article 2365 for the use of separate property to satisfy a community
obligation applies "solely to debts paid during the marriage, and
not those paid after divorce." 314 The court held that the wife was
entitled under this article "to reimbursement for community debts
she paid with separate funds before termination of the marriage,"
and that the article does not apply to debts paid after termination of
the marriage. 315 The following is the court's language:
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 provides:
If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation, that spouse, upon termination of the
community property regime, is entitled to reimbursement
for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at
the time it was used. The liability of a spouse who owes
reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the
community after deduction of all community obligations.
The phrase "upon termination of the community property
regime" is crucial to our interpretation of La.Civ.Code art.
2365. The Article does not say "upon partition," but
specifically uses the words "upon termination." Because of
the specific language used, it is clear that the
reimbursement scheme contemplated by La.Civ.Code art.
2365 pertains solely to debts paid during the marriage, and
not those paid after divorce. Thus, Ms. Sheridon would be
entitled, under La.Civ.Code art. 2365, to reimbursement for
community debts she paid with separate funds before
311. 799 So. 2d 829, 830 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001), writ denied, 808 So. 2d
344 (La. 2002), overruled by Sheridon v. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2004).






termination of the marriage. As such, La.Civ.Code art.
2365 is not applicable to the matter before us, and we
specifically overrule this holding in Nash.
In doing so, we conclude that the trial court erred in
ordering Mr. Sheridon to reimburse Ms. Sheridon one half
of the amount she paid on the Pontiac Firebird between
October 5, 1999, and November 15, 2001. Thus, we find
merit in the assignment of error.31 6
The phrase "upon termination of the community regime
317
does not relate in any way to the time when the debts subject to
reimbursement were paid.31 8 Rather, it restates the ancient rule
establishing the time when the action for reimbursement may be
instituted. There has always been a strong public policy in favor of
postponing settlement of the accounts between spouses and claims
for reimbursement until'the termination of the community. 31 9 The
quoted language reflects the continuation of this public policy.
316. Id.
317. The phrase "upon termination of a (or the) community property regime"
or the phrase "upon termination of the community" appears in the introductory
article to the Civil Code articles containing the reimbursement rules, LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2358 (2006), and in all but one of the reimbursement articles.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2364-67.1 (2006). It does not appear in article
2368. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (2006).
318. See Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 51 (Woodward, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part). This conclusion is reflected in the statute providing the
procedural rules for the partition of community property and the settlement of
the claims between the spouses arising from a matrimonial regime or from the
co-ownership of former community property following the termination of the
legal regime. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801A (2006). Section 9:2801A
limits this procedure to an action that would result in a termination of the
matrimonial regime or an action instituted after the termination of the
matrimonial regime. Id. In the former case, no judgment of partition shall be
rendered unless rendered in conjunction with, or subsequent to, the judgment
which has the effect of terminating the matrimonial regime. Id. § 9:2802.
Section 9:2801A, in its use of the phrase, "the settlement of the claims between
spouses arising from . . . the co-ownership of former community property
following termination of the matrimonial regime" contemplates reimbursement
claims arising after the termination of the legal regime. Id. § 9:2801A. In fact,
this is when most reimbursement claims arise.
319. Driggers v. Driggers, 569 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
Under prior law, an exception to this rule was the claim of the wife against the
husband for the restitution of the administration of her paraphernal property.
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The court in Sheridon, after quoting the phrase "upon
termination of community regime," holds that the article permits
reimbursement solely for debts paid during "the marriage," thus
equating the termination of the legal regime with the termination of
the marriage. 320 It is a rare situation, however, for the community
termination date and the marriage termination date to be the same.
In Sheridon, the community was terminated effective October
5, 1999, by a judgment of divorce rendered August 31, 2000.321
The four-day trial of the partition action ended November 15,
2001.322 The court denied the wife reimbursement for payments
she made on the automobile "between October 5, 1999, and
November 15, 2001. "323 However, she was married when she
made the payments between October 5, 1999, the date the
community terminated, and August 31, 2000, the date of the
divorce. 324 This is inconsistent with the court's ruling that "La.
Civ. Code art. 2365 pertains solely to debts paid during the
marriage and not those paid after divorce," and that Mrs. Sheridon
"would be entitled, under La. Civ. Code art. 2365, to
See Falconer v. Falconer, 120 So. 19 (La. 1929). See also W.O. Huie, Separate
Claims to Reimbursement From Community in Louisiana, 27 TtJL. L. REv. 143,
145 n.7 (1953). See Kenneth Rigby, Some Views, Old and New, On Recent
Developments in Family Law, 29 LA. B.J. 232 (1982), for the classifications of
property of the husband and wife under prior law.
320. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 44. The court stated:
The phrase "upon termination of the community property regime" is
crucial to our interpretation of La.Civ.Code art. 2365. The Article does
not say "upon partition," but specifically uses the words "upon
termination." Because of the specific language used, it is clear that the
reimbursement scheme contemplated by La.Civ.Code art. 2365 pertains
solely to debts paid during the marriage and not those paid after
divorce. Thus, Ms. Sheridon would be entitled, under La.Civ.Code art.
2365, to reimbursement for community debts she paid with separate
funds before termination of the marriage. As such, La.Civ.Code art.
2365 is not applicable to the matter before us, and we specifically
overrule this holding in Nash.
Id.
321. Id. at 41. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 159 (2006).
322. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 41.




reimbursement for community debts she _aid with her separate
funds before termination of the marriage."
Also, inconsistently, the court allowed Mrs. Sheridon
reimbursement for one-half of the mortgage payments on the
family home that she had made between October 5, 1999, and
November 15, 2001,. the same period for which she was denied
reimbursement for the automobile payments.326 This span of time
also included a period after the divorce on August 31, 2000.327
In a subsequent third circuit case, Philmon v. Philmon, this
same inconsistency in the declaration of the law and its application
is repeated. 328 The Philmons were divorced August 4, 2000.329
The husband occupied and paid the mortgage payments on the
family home from February 1, 2001, through June 18, 2003, the
date of the partition judgment in which he was awarded the
home.330  Relying on Sheridon, the court affirmed the
reimbursement award for the payments made entirely during this
post-divorce period:
Mrs. Haymark contends that Sheridon supports
disallowance of reimbursement for mortgage payments,
however, this reading of Sheridon is incorrect. In Sheridon,
the court allowed Mrs. Sheridon to receive reimbursement
for mortgage payments made from October 5, 1999 until
November 15, 2001 (period from the date Mrs. Sheridon
filed for divorce until the date of partition). The court
disallowed the reimbursement of mortgage payments made
from November 15, 2001 until August 15, 2002 (the date of
partition to the date of judgment). The portion of the
opinion Mrs. Haymark quotes pertains to reimbursement
for payments made on a community movable and does not
pertain to a community immovable.
325. Id. at 44.
326. Id. at 49. However, the court disallowed reimbursement for the
mortgage payments made after the last day of the partition trial, November 15,
2001, and before August 16, 2002, the date upon which the court issued written
reasons for judgment. Id.
327. Id.
328. 886 So. 2d 1222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
329. Id. at 1224.
330. Id. at 1225.
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Mr. Philmon maintained the family home and paid all the
'mortgage payments from February 2001 through June
2003. This time period is prior to the community partition
and as such, the home remained community property. The
Sheridon case supports our decision today as they allowed
reimbursement for the period the home was community
property, but disallowed reimbursement for the period of
time following the partition. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court's decision to award the defendant reimbursement for
mortgage payments made on the family home from
February 2001 until June 2003.331
There are, however, much more serious concerns than these.
Both the introductory article and all but one of the reimbursement
articles contain the phrase "upon termination of the [or a]
community property regime. If that phrase means what
Sheridon suggests, the claims for which reimbursement may be
sought have been greatly reduced. The reimbursement claim most
commonly urged in a partition action, the use of separate funds to
pay a community obligation after termination of the community,
331. Id. at 1227 (citation omitted). The opinion states, in the quoted portion
reproduced above, that the time period (for which reimbursement was allowed)
is prior to the community partition and as such, the home is considered
community property and that "[t]he Sheridon case supports our decision today
as they [sic] allowed reimbursement for the period the home was community
property. .. ." Id. Of course, the property did not remain community property
after the termination of the community regime by the judgment of divorce. See
id. It was former community property, now co-owned by the spouses. Id. See
also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts 2369.1-69.8 (2006). All of the payments for
which reimbursement was allowed were made after the judgment of divorce.
Philmon, 886 So. 2d at 1227. This is inconsistent with Sheridon's ruling that
article 2365 permits reimbursement only for payments made during the marriage
and not those made after divorce. The court's apparent distinction between
payments made on a community movable after divorce, reimbursement for
which is not allowed, and those made on a community immovable after divorce,
for which reimbursement is allowed, finds no basis in the Civil Code.
In Moore v. Moore, 917 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2005), the court
reaffirmed that in Sheridon it allowed reimbursement for mortgage payments
made after termination of the community, after stating that in Sheridon it held
that article 2365 "pertains solely to debts paid during the marriage, and not to
those paid after termination of the community."
332. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2358, 2365-67.1 (2006).
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has been eliminated. The vast majority of reimbursement claims
involve the payment of community obligations with separate funds
after termination of the community. 333 Most of these are the result
of the payment of community obligations which are outstanding at
the time of the termination of the community, paid by one or both
spouses out of their current earnings, their separate property.
334
These include myriad types of community obligations, including a
mortgage on the family home, mortgages on automobiles, boats,
motors and trailers, unsecured bank loans, and multiple credit card
balances. 3
35
Nor may the use of Louisiana Civil Code article 806 be a
viable vehicle on which to base the vast majority of reimbursement
claims. Louisiana Civil Code article 806 limits reimbursement to
three types of claims arising "on account of the thing held in
indivision." 336  This article, contained in the articles regulating
ownership in indivision,337 applies only when two or more persons
own the same thing and is restricted to certain types of claims
arising out of the co-owned thing.338 First, according to Roque v.
Tate and its progeny, Louisiana Civil Code article 806 does not
authorize reimbursement for the payments made on a mortgage on
former community property.339 Louisiana Civil Code article 2365
is the controlling article because a mortgage is not a "necessary
expense," as that term is used in article 806.340 Many of the




336. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 806 (2006).
337. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 797-818 (2006). These are ordinary
expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs, and necessary
management expenses paid to third persons. Id.
338. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 806 (2006).
339. Roque v. Tate, 631 So. 2d 1385, 1386 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ not
considered, 637 So. 2d 457 (La. 1994). See also Lupberger v. Lupberger, 805
So. 2d 264, 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2001), writ denied, 816 So. 2d 308 (La.
2002); Cahill v. Karins, 784 So. 2d 685, 690-91 (La. App. 2d Cir 2001); Roger
v. Roger, 751 So. 2d 354, 356-57 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 759 So. 2d 73
(La. 2000); Kline v. Kline, 741 So. 2d 670, 673 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
340. Roque, 631 So. 2d at 1387. This case has been criticized by the writer.
See Rigby, supra note 123, at 510.
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reimbursement claims asserted after termination of the community
do not arise out, of the co-ownership of former community
property.34' They arise out of the payment of unsecured
community obligations such as credit card balances, unsecured
loans, utility bills, department store charge accounts, and many
others to which the co-ownership rules have no application.342
Combined, the decisions holding that article 806 does not
authorize reimbursement for payments made on a mortgage on co-
owned former community property because article 2365 is the
controlling article for this type of reimbursement claim, and the
decisions holding that article 2365 does not allow reimbursement
for payments made after divorce on community obligations create
a conundrum.
Also, the Sheridon ruling results in a disincentive for spouses
to pay community obligations after termination of the community.
This results in a windfall to the spouse who does not contribute to
the payment of the former community obligations, and an unjust
burden on the spouse who does. The Sheridon error, like the
Gachez depreciable assets error, must be judicially or legislatively
corrected.
Gill v. Gill also presented the issue of the proper measure of
reimbursement to the husband for mortgage payments made with
community funds on a building in which the wife practiced her
profession as a certified public accountant and a house in which
the couple first resided during their marriage.343 Both immovables
were the separate property of the wife.344 The issue was whether
the reimbursement claim was limited to one-half of the principal
portion of the payments made with community funds.345 Although
both claims were rejected for lack of an evidentiary breakdown of
the mortgage payments between principal and interest, the case
contains a review of the jurisprudence. 3 If the separate property
produces civil fruits during the community regime, the interest
341. This is based on the experience of the writer and other family law
practitioners.
342. Id.
343. 895 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005).
344. Id. at 810.
345. Id. at 811.
346. Id. at 811-13.
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paid is treated as a cost of providing those civil fruits, which are
community property absent the filing of a required reservation.347
Therefore, as a cost of producing community income, the interest
is treated as a community expense and no reimbursement is due for
it.348 However, if the separate immovable does not produce civil
fruits or other income, the measure of reimbursement is one-half of
the total payment.349 If the separate immovable is a house
occupied as the home of the spouses during the legal regime,
jurisprudence has disallowed a reimbursement claim for the taxes,
insurance, and interest paid, allowing reimbursement for only the
principal paid.3 50 The genesis for this jurisprudence is Hurta v.
Hurta, decided under prior law.
351
In Hurta, the husband owned as separate property a house
which was used as the marital home. 352 Community funds were
used to pay the mortgage note during the marriage, including
principal, interest, and taxes.353  Former Louisiana Civil Code
article 2402 provided that the community consisted of the profits
of all of the effects of which the husband (as head and master of
the community) had the administration and enjoyment.354 The
347. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (2006). See Major v. Major, 671 So. 2d
571, 580 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Parker v. Parker, 517 So. 2d 264, 265 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1987); Longo v. Longo, 474 So. 2d 500, 503--04 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 477 So. 2d 711 (La. 1985); Hurta v. Hurta, 260 So. 2d 324,
326-27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) and cases cited therein.
348. Hurta, 260 So. 2d at 327. See also Munson v. Munson, 772 So. 2d 141,
146 n.13 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000) and the cases cited therein.
349. Munson, 772 So. 2d at 146. This was the result in Gill v. Gill, 895 So.
2d 807, 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005), which allowed the wife full reimbursement
for the mortgage payments made by her post-termination on the community
house occupied by her.
350. Hurta, 260 So. 2d at 326-27.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 324.
353. Id.
354. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2402 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No.
709, § 1. Former article 2402 provided:
This partnership or community consists of the profits of all the effects
of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of
right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of
both husband and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire during
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fourth circuit held that "a community which uses as its home a
house belonging to the husband's separate estate does receive the
'profits' of that home. 355 Therefore, it concluded that the taxes,
insurance premiums, and interest included in the payments were
properly paid out of the community and that the "community" did
not have a reimbursement claim against the husband for these
expenditures. 356 Hurta was followed by Willis v. Willis, which was
decided under the present matrimonial regimes law and involved
payments on the mortgage both before and after January 1, 1980,
the effective date of the present matrimonial regimes law.3 57 With
respect to the payments made before January 1, 1980, the court
applied the Hurta analysis.358 With respect to the payments made
after January 1, 1980, the court correctly stated that the natural and
civil fruits of separate property are community property unless
reserved. 359  The court then held that the use of the husband's
separate property by the spouses as the marital residence "was an
enjoyment of the 'natural and civil fruits' of the separate
property." 360 However, the use of a thing is neither a natural fruit
nor a civil fruit of that thing.361 The jurisprudence has continued to
rely on Willis and its flawed analysis without reexamining the
the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by
purchase, or in any other similar way ....
Id.
355. Hurta, 260 So. 2d at 327.
356. Id.
357. 454 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
358. Id. at 430.
359. Id. at 431.
360. Id.
361. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 551 (2006) (defining fruits as things that are
produced by or derived from another thing without diminution of its substance).
It states that there are two kinds of fruits: natural fruits and civil fruits. Id.
Natural fruits are the products of the earth or of animals. Id. Civil fruits are
revenues derived from a thing by operation of law as by reason of a juridical act,
such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate dividends. Id. Nowhere is it
suggested that the use of a thing is a fruit, natural or civil, of the thing used. In
fact, the right to use a thing is one of three types of personal servitudes: usufruct,
habitation, and rights of use. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 534 (2006). The
right of use is governed by the provisions of articles 639-645. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. arts. 639-45 (2006).
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362issue. It has been suggested that the jurisprudence can be
explained by the application of that portion of Louisiana Civil
Code article 236336 defining a separate obligation, in part, as one
incurred for the separate property of a spouse "to the extent that it
does not benefit the community, the family, or the other
spouse. ' 3 4 The inference is that insofar as it benefits one of these
classes, it is a community obligation. The resolution of the issue in
terms of the definition of the obligation instead of the
reimbursement rules is not without difficulty. The obligation in
these cases is the indebtedness incurred prior to marriage, secured
by a mortgage. The obligation is not the payments made to satisfy
the obligation. The classification of an obligation is determined, in
part, by when it is incurred and, if incurred during the existence of
the legal regime, by the intent or purpose in incurring the
obligation.365 As with the classification of things, an obligation is
classified as separate or community at the moment the obligation is
incurred.366 Having been incurred prior to the establishment of the
legal regime, the obligation is the separate obligation of the spouse
who incurred it.367 The obligation is secured by a mortgage on
separate property. 368 The classification of funds used to pay a
mortgage indebtedness on a house cannot change the classification
of the house;369 neither should a benefit accruing to "the
community, the family, or the other spouse 3 70 subsequent to the
362. See Gill v. Gill, 895 So. 2d 807, 817 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005); Munson v.
Munson, 772 So. 2d 141, 145-46 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000).
363. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (2006) (defining a separate obligation, in
part, as "an obligation incurred for the separate property of a spouse to the
extent that it does not benefit the community, the family, or the other spouse").
364. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 19, at § 7.12, at 375 n.49.
365. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2360 (2006) (defining a community
obligation), and LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2363 (2006) (defining a separate
obligation).
366. Gill, 895 So. 2d at 811; Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1105, 1113
(La. 2001); Biondo v. Biondo, 769 So. 2d 94, 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000); Peters
v. Haley, 762 So. 2d 695, 699 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 766 So. 2d 547
(La. 2000); Noil v. Noil, 699 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Smith
v. Smith, 685 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
367. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (2006).
368. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3278 (2006).
369. Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56, 59-60 (La. 1981).
370. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (2006).
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incurring of the obligation, the use by the family of the residence
upon which the mortgage was imposed prior to marriage, change
the classification of the obligation, in whole or in part. The quoted
provision of article 2363 applies to an obligation incurred during
the community property regime for the benefit of separate property
of a spouse but which also benefits the family.37 1 If a spouse
incurs an obligation to extensively renovate separate rental
property in order to increase the rent to be received from it, the
renovations may increase the value of the separate property as well
as increase community rental income. Such an obligation is partly
community and partly separate. This provision of article 2363
should not be applied so as to retroactively change the separate
classification of an obligation incurred prior to the establishment of
the community regime.
In the case of the use of mortgaged separate property as a
marital residence, the plain language of article 2364 should be
applied, and the measure of reimbursement should be one-half of
the value of the community money used to satisfy the mortgage
indebtedness.
VIII. INTERSPOUSAL DUTIES UNDER LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
ARTICLE 2369.3
Ellington v. Ellington involved the application of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2369.3 in two situations: (1) the operation of a
community corporation, and (2) the disposition of a certificate of
deposit owned by the corporation. 372 Article 2369.3 imposes a
duty on a spouse to preserve and manage prudently, in the manner
outlined in the article, former community property under the
control of a spouse. 373 In Ellington, the corporation was engaged
in the business of buying cotton from farmers, cotton gins, and
others and selling it to textile mills and shippers.374 The first
situation involved a claim that the husband had formed, after the
termination of the community, two new corporations for the
371. Id.
372. 842 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1269
(La. 2003).
373. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006).
374. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1163.
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purpose of diverting the assets of the community corporation to the
two new corporations. 375 The court found that the wife had not
proven this claim.376 The court found that these two new
corporations were formed for legitimate purposes, that the
transactions between the corporations were at arm's length and in
good faith, and that there was no violation by the husband of his
article 2369.3 duty to his wife.
377
In a similar case, Brown v. Brown, the fiduciary duties of
officers and directors of a corporation to the corporation and its
stockholders were invoked instead of the article 2369.3 duty to the
other spouse.378 When Brown was decided, this approach had a
distinct advantage. The corporate officer owed a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its stockholders, 379 and he had the burden of
proving that he had not breached his fiduciary duty.380 A spouse
375. Id. at 1171.
376. Id. at 1175.
377. Id.
378. 680 So. 2d 1203, 1211-12 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 684 So. 2d
939 (La. 1996).
379. At the time Brown was decided, Louisiana Revised Statutes Section
12:91 provided:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and its shareholders, and shall discharge the duties of
their respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence, care,
judgment and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions. Nothing herein contained shall
derogate from any indemnification authorized by R.S. 12:83.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91, amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 1253, § 1.
The amendment of Section 12:91 made substantial changes to the section.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (1994 & Supp. 2006). Although retaining the
fiduciary duty of the officers and directors to the corporation and its
shareholders, it lowered the standard of care and imposed the burden of proof on
the person alleging a breach of the duty imposed by the statute. Id. Although
Section 12:91 may encompass a violation of duties not owed under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2369.3, the advantage of the use of Section 12:91 in the case
of former community property has been greatly diminished if not eliminated
entirely. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006), with LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:91 (1994 & Supp. 2006).
380. Thornton ex rel. Laneco Constr. Sys., Inc. v. Lanehart, 723 So. 2d 1127,
1134 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1998), writ denied, 740 So. 2d 115 (La. 1999); Scurria v.
Hodge, 720 So. 2d 460, 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998), writ denied, 739 So. 2d
782 (La. 1999). On the other hand, the spouse alleging a violation of the article
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subject to the article 2369.3 duty has the standard of care of a
usufructuary.
38 1
The second situation in Ellington concerned the "cashing in" of
a $500,000.00 certificate of deposit owned by the corporation in
order to liquidate a bank debt owed by the corporation. 382 The
court held that this transaction was not a violation of the husband's
article 2369.3 duty.383 The application of this article to this
transaction is doubtful. The article imposes upon a spouse an
affirmative duty to preserve and manage prudently former
community property under his control in a manner consistent with
the mode of use of that property immediately prior to the
termination of the community regime. 84  Property owned by a
corporation is neither community nor separate property of the
spouses who own stock in the corporation as community
385 .386property. It is owned by the juridical person, the corporation.
2369.3 duty by the other spouse has the burden of proof. Ellington, 842 So. 2d
at 1172.
381. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 cmt. (e) (2006). See also LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 576 (2006) (standard of care of a usufructuary).
382. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1174.
383. Id. at 1175.
384. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006).
385. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 868 So. 2d 844, 849-50 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 882 So. 2d 609 (La. 2004).
386. Id. (holding assets owned by corporate entity are property of that entity
and acquisitions are not community property of owner-spouses). See also
Taylor v. Taylor, 772 So. 2d 891, 898-99 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000).
The McClanahan case reflects a long line of cases holding that the owner of a
juridical person does not own the assets of that juridical person. See cases cited
infra this note. Because of the recent vintage of limited liability companies,
most of the jurisprudence applying this distinction involves partnerships and
corporations. Id. However, the statute authorizing limited liability companies
statutorily mandates this distinction. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1329
(1994). This section states: "A membership interest shall be an incorporeal
movable. A member shall have no interest in limited liability company
property." Id. (emphasis added).
This principle is reflected in the Louisiana Civil Code and in the
jurisprudence. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24, and cmts. (d) and (e) (2006).
A partnership is a juridical person, distinct from its partners who compose it.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (2006). A partnership has its own patrimony.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 cmt. (e) (2006). The partners are not the owners
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Article 2369.3 regulates the duties owed by a spouse to the other
spouse with respect to former community property under the
control of that spouse.387 The certificate of deposit in Ellington
was not former community property of the spouses. It was owned
by a juridical person, Noble Ellington Cotton Company, a
corporation.388 However, if article 2369.3 were applicable to the
certificate of deposit, the disposition of it by the corporation
of partnership property. Trappy v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 So. 2d 515,
517 (La. 1956). The partnership, not the partners, is the owner. Id. It belongs
to the ideal being. Posner v. Little Pine Lumber Co., 102 So. 16, 18 (La. 1924)
(citing Succession of Pitcher, 1 So. 929, 932 (La. 1887)). See also Harrington v.
Harrington, 151 So. 648, 649 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d' 161, 166 (La.
1977), was careful to point out that any contingent fee contracts which were the
property of Mr. Due's law partnership could not be community property:
As to an ancillary point, we should note that the court of appeal
correctly held that any contingent fee contracts which are the property
of the defendant's law partnership cannot be considered as assets of the
community. The partnership is a separate entity. However, the
husband's interest in the partnership is, to the extent acquired during
the marriage, a community asset the value of which should be included
in the inventory.
In Dubuisson v. Moseley, 232 So. 2d 870, 872 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), cited
in Due, the court held that a checking account of a law partnership "was not a
community checking account," and that "[t]he community only had an interest
in the partnership...."
In Fastabend v. Fastabend, 606 So. 2d 794, 798 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 609 So. 2d 231 (La. 1992), the court correctly held that the accounts
receivable of a medical partnership, in which the physician husband was a
partner, "are an asset of the partnership itself' and "they are not a community
asset."
Like a partnership, a corporation is a legal entity (juridical person) separate
and distinct from the individuals who compose it, and it has a separate and
distinct existence apart from its stockholders and officers. Nicholson Mgmt. &
Consultants, Inc. v. Bergman, 681 So. 2d 471,477 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996), writ
denied, 685 So. 2d 126 (La. 1997); Korson v. Independence Mall I Ltd., 593 So.
2d 981, 984 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Deroche v. P & L Constr. Materials, Inc.,
554 So. 2d 717, 719 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1359 (La.
1990); Phillips v. Wagner, 470 So. 2d 262, 267 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
474 So. 2d 948 (La. 1985).
387. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006).
388. Ellington, 842 So. 2d at 1163.
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appears to be a violation of the duty to preserve and manage it in a
manner consistent with the mode of use of that property
immediately prior to the termination of the community regime.
389
The certificate of deposit was neither preserved nor managed in the
required manner. The court did find, however, that the transaction
did not prejudice the corporation or the wife in any way.390 The
court found that any article 2369.3 violation was not actionable
because no damage was caused to the wife by the transaction.
391
IX. TRANSACTION OR COMPROMISE
At issue in Hoover v. Hoover was whether an extra-judicial
community property settlement was a transaction or compromise,
which is not subject to attack on grounds of lesion, or an extra-
judicial partition, which may be attacked on grounds of lesion.392
The supreme court noted that extra-judicial partitions of
community property may have aspects or qualities of a transaction
or compromise, but the fact that they do does not make the
agreement unassailable for lesion.393 The court noted the seeming
conflict between two Civil Code articles and its resolution of the
issue in its earlier decision, Williamson v. Amilton,394 stating: "A
partition, even when it takes upon itself the aspect and qualities of
a compromise, may be attacked for lesion beyond one-fourth; but
the partition once made, if disputes grow out of it, and the parties
compromise on those disputes, this compromise is unassailable for
lesion. 39
5
The court correctly pointed out that community property
partition agreements have, by their very nature, some aspects or
389. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006). Ellington concluded that Mr.
Ellington's use of the certificate of deposit to reduce outstanding company debt
did not rise to the level of mismanagement or diversion. 842 So. 2d at 1175.
390. Id.
391. Id. In Norman v. Norman, the fourth circuit held that a spouse, in
complying with his article 2369.3 duty, may be required to use his separate
funds, which will be reimbursable, to satisfy a community obligation. 775 So.
2d 18, 23-24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
392. 813 So. 2d 329, 330 (La. 2002).
393. Id. at 333.
394. 13 La. Ann. 387 (1858).
395. Hoover, 813 So. 2d at 333 (quoting Williamson, 13 La. Ann. at 388).
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396qualities of a transaction or compromise. Rare indeed would be
a negotiated community property partition agreement that was not
subject to disputes which are resolved by compromise. The
decision is a good, practical solution to a worrisome problem.
X. PREEMPTION AND PARTITION
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801.1 provides in part:
When federal law or the provisions of a statutory pension
or retirement plan, state or federal, [including but not
limited to social security] preempt or preclude community
classification of property that would have been classified as
community property under the principles of the Civil Code,
the spouse of the person entitled to such property shall be
allocated or assigned the ownership of community property
equal in value to such property rior to the division of the
rest of the community property.
In McKinstry v. McKinstry, the wife urged the application of
this statute with respect to her husband's social security benefits, to
offset her Louisiana Teachers' Retirement Plan benefits, which
were allocated according to the Sims398 formula.3 99 However, all
the community assets had been previously allocated in the partition
proceedings in two judgments rendered before the enactment of
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801.1, neither one of which
had been appealed.400 The court held that after all the community
property had been divided, a spouse may no longer assert the
remedy of the statute.401 In fact, the language of the statute
mandates that the offsetting allocation of other assets must be done
396. See id. at 332-33.
397. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.1 (2006) (amended 2003). It should be
noted that in all cases except those involving social security benefits, the
allocation to the other spouse of community property of equal value is
mandatory. Id. In the case of social security benefits, the allocation to the other
spouse of community property of equal value is discretionary. Id. The reason
for this disparity of treatment of social security benefits and other preempted
property is not clear from the statute. See id.
398. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 924 (La. 1978).
399. 824 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002), writ denied, 834 So. 2d
438 (La. 2003).
400. Id. at 1262.
401. Id.
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in a partition action "prior to the division of the rest of the
community property. 'A It envisions some type of bifurcation of
the process outlined in Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801
in which this offsetting allocation is done as a preliminary step in
the partition action before the allocation of other assets and
obligations and the settlement of the claims between the
spouses.40 3 Unlike Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:374(E),
which authorizes but does not require the allocation of the use of
certain community property during a divorce proceeding or
thereafter pending a formal partition proceeding, Section 9:2801.1
mandates the allocation or assignment of the ownership of
community property prior to the division of the rest of the
community property. It is contrary to the long established
402. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.1 (2006) (amended 2003).
403. See id.
404. Compare id. § 9:374E, with id. § 9:2801.1. Paragraph (2) of Section
9:374E provides that upon court order, each spouse shall provide the other a
complete accounting of all community assets subsequent to said allocation and
in compliance with Louisiana Civil Code article 2369.3, providing the duty to
preserve and prudently manage community property. Id. § 9:374E. The duty to
account is apparently not limited to the community property, the use of which
has been allocated, but includes all community property. Id. Article 2369.3
applies only to former community property under the control of a spouse. See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.1 (2006). See also supra notes 370-91.
Additionally, article 2369.3 is not an accounting provision; it mandates duties
with respect to the preservation and management of former community property
under the control. of a spouse. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006). In
contrast, article 2369 imposes an accounting obligation on a spouse who has
community property under his control at the moment of the termination of the
community. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (2006). See also LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art.. 2369.3 cmt. (c) (2006) (explaining the differences between the two
articles). The provision in Section 9:374E(2) does not appear to create a new
accounting duty; it simply provides that the accounting that may be ordered after
the allocation of the use of community property shall be "in compliance with
Civil Code Article 2369.3," which imposes the duty to preserve and prudently
manage (former) community property. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:374E(2)
(2006). Since article 2369.3 does not establish a duty to account, the meaning of
the reference is obscure. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2006). However,
this language might have been meant to impose the articles 2369 and 2369.3
duties on a spouse with respect to the property of which he has been allocated
the use, during the period he has the use of it. If so, it involves more than an
accounting duty. It imposes a preservation and prudent management duty. Id.
However, that duty is already imposed by article 2369.3 upon a spouse who has
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public policy against the piecemeal partition of community
property.40 5 The legislation restricts the flexibility of the court in
dividing the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse
receives property of an equal net value.40 6 It is particularly
troublesome that Section 9:2801.1 requires the allocation of
offsetting assets prior to the division of the rest of the community
407property. In a community property partition proceeding, the
allocation of assets and liabilities is not done in isolation with
respect to each other or to an equalizing payment. If a
disproportionate amount of assets are allocated to one spouse for
in his control former community property during the period prior to its partition.
Id. It may have been intended to impose an additional accounting duty, like that
in article 2369, on a spouse at the termination of the period of the use of the
property. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (2006). This would be a new
accounting duty, as that imposed by article 2369 is limited to property under the
control of a spouse at the termination of the community property regime. Id. If
so, two problems are presented. The reference to article 2369.3 and the
requirement that the accounting be in compliance with that article cannot be
correct. Also, the accounting duty is not limited by the language of the statute to
the property, the use of which has been allocated to a spouse. It requires that
"each spouse" shall provide an accounting to the other spouse "of all community
assets." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:374E (2006). The obligation to account
imposed by article 2369 means to provide an explanation of what happened to
the property. In re Succession of Caraway, 639 So. 2d 415, 420 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1994). As written, the article imposes a duty on a spouse to account not
only for the property he has been using, but to explain what happened to the
property his former spouse has been using. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369
(2006). The duty to account for "all community assets" also includes property
the use of which was not allocated, but which is in the possession of the other
spouse. Id. The statute imposes duties with which a spouse may not be able to
comply. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:374E (2006). If it imposes a duty to account,
it should be limited to the duty to account for the property the use of which he
has been allocated. If it imposes an article 2369.3 duty to preserve and manage
prudently in the manner described in that article, it should be limited to the
property the use of which he has been allocated. If both duties are imposed,
they likewise should be limited to that former community property.
405. Guillaume v. Guillaume, 603 So. 2d 235, 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992);
Marshall v. Marshall, 551 So. 2d 6, 7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Hicks v. Hicks,
497 So. 2d 44, 45 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 473 So. 2d 112,
114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
406. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.1 (2006).
407. Id.
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one of the reasons listed in Section 9:2801A(4)(c) or for other
reasons, equality can be achieved by a disproportionate allocation
of liabilities to that spouse, or by an equalizing payment, or
both.40 8 There may not, in fact, be assets available to offset the
value of the preempted assets, which cannot be allocated as
community property under the statute. The statute only permits the
allocation of assets as an offset.40 9 The statute does not authorize
the allocation of community liabilities or the ordering of an
equalizing payment to remedy the unequal division of assets. 410 In
households of limited means, social security benefits may
constitute a major portion of the property of the parties. 411 The
same may be true in households in which the employed spouse is
subject to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974412 or those in which
a spouse is receiving military disability payments.4 13 In these and
other instances, there may not be sufficient assets available to
offset the preempted assets.
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801.1 also presents a
serious federal preemption issue. As noted, it mandates allocating
non-preempted community assets to one spouse equal in value to
the preempted assets which belong to the other spouse and may not
be allocated. In Boggs v. Boggs, the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974
("ERISA") preempts Louisiana community property laws.414 In
Boggs, the two sons of the first wife sued the second wife for a
408. Id. § 9:2801A(4)(c) and (d).
409. Id. § 9:2801.1.
410. See id
411. The provisions of the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance
Family Plan ("OASDI") of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 et seq.
(2003 & Supp. I 2005), preempt the application of Louisiana community
property laws. Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 712 So. 2d 1024, 1026-27 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1998). See Rigby, supra note 123, at 472.
412. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231v (1986 & Supp. 1 2005). The Act provides two
tiers of benefits to railroad workers, Tier I and Tier II benefits. Id. Tier II
benefits may be distributed as community or marital property; Tier I benefits
may not. Lee v. Lee, 727 So. 2d 622, 626-27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998). See
Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes, supra note 21, at 405-06 for a discussion of the
Act and Lee.
413. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
414. 520 U.S. 833, 841-42, reh'g denied, 521 U.S. 1138 (1997).
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partition of the survivor annuity benefits received by the second
wife, claiming a testamentary disposition of these rights from their
mother.415 No claim was asserted against the South Central Bell
ERISA retirement plan.416 The Court held that the statutory
objective of the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions was
to assure a stream of income to a surviving spouse.4 1' The fact that
the claim was against only the beneficiary and not the retirement
plan did not prevent preemption' as the diversion of income from
the surviving spouse occurs regardless of whether the interest in
the pension plan is enforced against the plan or the recipient of the
pension benefit.
418
In an earlier case, Free v. Bland, the United States Supreme
Court held that federal regulations governing United States
Savings Bonds and Savings Notes determined not only the
ownership of the bonds, but also the ownership of the proceeds of419
the bonds. In Free, community funds were used to purchase the
bonds, which were registered in the names of the husband and wife
as co-owners. 42 Under federal regulations, upon the death of the
wife, the husband became the owner of the bonds.421 Under Texas
law, he was required to reimburse the wife's separate estate for the
bonds.422 The United States Supreme Court held that the state rule
requiring reimbursement was preempted by federal law and
regulations.423  A Louisiana state court reached the same
conclusion in Succession of Harrell.424
Boggs relied heavily on Free, which held that to award full title
of savings bonds to the co-owner but require him to account to the
decedent's estate for half of the value of the bonds, when
"[v]iewed realistically," renders the award of title
415. Id. at 837-38.
416. Id at 856-57.
417. Id. at 843.
418. Id. at 847-48.
419. 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962).
420. Id. at 664-65.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 665.
423. Id. at 670.
424. 622 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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"meaningless., 425 Allocating other community property to offset
the value of the preempted asset under Louisiana Revised Statutes
Section 9:2801.1 has the same functional effect as permitting a
reimbursement or other monetary claim by the other spouse for the
value of the preempted assets. Such a "back door" approach is not
permissible, whatever the mechanism that is used to offset the
preempted assets.
Whether a state statute is preempted by federal law or
regulation is not a constitutional issue, but a matter of statutory
interpretation.426 If a state law is preempted by federal law, the
state law is not rendered unconstitutional. 27 This distinction has
important consequences in Louisiana practice. With limited
exceptions, the long standing jurisprudential rule in Louisiana is
that litigants must raise constitutional attacks in the trial courts.
Litigants may not raise constitutional challenges for the first time
in the appellate courts. The constitutional challenge also must be
specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized.428
A party asserting the unconstitutionality of a state statute in a
declaratory judgment action must serve the Louisiana Attorney
General with a copy of the proceeding.429 In other proceedings in
which the constitutionality of a statute is raised, the Attorney
General should be served notice and/or a copy of the pleading.43 °
Pleading preemption in the trial court does not appear to be
mandatory because it is not a contention that the state statute is
unconstitutional, nor is it required under Louisiana's scheme of
425. Free, 369 U.S. at 669. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 469-73 for a
discussion of Thibodeaux and Boggs.
426. Capitol City Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. State, 842 So. 2d 321, 321
(La. 2003). See Capitol City Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. State, 873 So. 2d 706,
710 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 876 So. 2d 94 (La. 2004), for the resolution
of the preemption issue after the case was transferred to the court of appeal.
427. City of Baton Rouge v. Goings, 684 So. 2d 396, 397 (La. 1996). In
contrast, a state statute which conflicts with or violates a substantive
constitutional provision, such as the Fifth Amendment, does raise a
constitutional issue. Id.
428. Mosing v. Domas, 830 So. 2d 967, 975 (La. 2002); Vallo v. Gayle Oil
Co., 646 So. 2d 859, 864-65 (La. 1994); Reno v. Scafco, L.L.C., 870 So. 2d
311, 314 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 882 So. 2d 1142 (La. 2004).




fact pleading because it is an issue of law. 43 1 However, failure to
raise the preemption issue in the trial court in some manner may
preclude an appellate court from considering the issue because of
the jurisprudential rule that generally appellate courts will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.432
XI. USE OF EXPERT WITNESSES
The issue of whether expert witnesses may testify in the trial of
a community property partition action was revisited in Boone v.
Boone.433 The case involved the classification of distributions to
the husband by a community Subchapter S corporation after the
termination of the community.434 The wife contended that they
were civil fruits of the community stock of the corporation and
thus were community property; the husband contended that they
resulted primarily from his skill, industry, and labor after
termination of the community and hence were his separate
property.435 The husband's principal expert witness was a board-
certified tax attorney, who used the Paxton v. Bramlette4 36 "ratio of
labor to capital approach" in his analysis and concluded that the
post-community distributions to the husband were in the nature of
income produced by the husband's skill, industry, and labor
subsequent to the termination of the community and hence were
his separate property.43
7
The opinion does not reflect a disagreement as to whether an
expert witness could be used to resolve the classification issue.
The objection to the use of this expert witness was that "he had no
expertise in family law or community property law," and,
therefore, could not "assist the trier of fact to understand the
431. See Dean v. Southmark Constr., 879 So. 2d 112, 116 (La. 2004);
Foreman v. Babin, 887 So. 2d 143, 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004).
432. Foreman, 887 So. 2d at 153; Dean, 879 So. 2d at 116; Mosing, 830 So.
2d at 975.
433. 899 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2005).
434. Id. at 825.
435. Id. at 826-27.
436. 228 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ denied, 230 So. 2d 92 (La.
1970).
437. Boone, 899 So. 2d at 825.
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evidence or to determine a fact at issue.' ' 438 The court noted the
lack of uniformity in the jurisprudence on the issue of whether to
allow attorneys to testify as experts regarding matters of domestic
(Louisiana) law.439 Generally, the courts do not permit it on the
theory that the court itself is an expert on domestic law. 440 The
court noted that the cases upheld the. district court's -discretion as to
the admissibility and weight of expert testimony.44' Although the
court's opinion reviews the jurisprudence on the issue of whether
an attorney's expert opinion is admissible regarding domestic
law,44 2 the classification of a thing as community or separate is an
issue of fact, not law.
43
The statutory authorization for the use of testimony by experts
is Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702.4 " If specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact at issue, expert testimony may be used for this
purpose." 5 The expert may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion, or otherwise. 4 6
In Morrison v. Johnston, the court, citing a treatise on
Louisiana evidence and Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702,
held that in a jury case, expert opinions on Louisiana law are
inadmissable." However, in an opinion the next year, State v.
Widenhouse, the same appellate court approved of expert
testimony by Dr. George Seiden, who taught forensic psychiatry at
438. See LA. CODE Evil). ANN. art. 702 (2005).




443. Ross v. Ross, 857 So. 2d 384, 395 (La. 2003); Biondo v. Biondo, 769
So. 2d 94, 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000); Peters v. Haley, 762 So. 2d 695, 702 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 766 So. 2d 547 (La. 2000); Harvey v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 696 So. 2d 672, 677 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Dawson v. Dawson, 610 So.
2d 917, 919 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1992).
444. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 702 (2005).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. 571 So. 2d 788, 791 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990). The proffered testimony
was that of the secretary-treasurer of the Louisiana Board of Dentistry
concerning his opinion and interpretation of various rules and regulations
promulgated by the Louisiana Board of Dentistry, which have the force and
effect of law. Id. at 790-91.
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the LSU Medical Center in Shreveport, in which Dr. Seiden
described the different legal standards for determining sanity.
448
The court admitted his testimony because it aided the jury's
understanding of the basis for the experts' opinions, and helped the
jury understand that they had to decide the question of the
defendant's sanity under Louisiana law rather than making a
medical determination. 449 The court cited State v. James, which
held that there was no error in allowing a forensic psychiatrist who
taught a forensics course at Tulane University School of Law to
testify about the differences in the applicable Louisiana standard
and the federal standard for insanity. '0
Martello v. City of Ferriday held that the testimony of an
attorney who was an expert on class certification was inadmissible
because his testimony would consist of legal opinions and
conclusions of law. 451 Martello cited Wilson v. Wilson, which held
that the domestic law testimony of an expert is not proper, as
distinguished from foreign law testimony, on the theory that the452
court itself is the expert on domestic law. Wilson, however, held
that a trial judge has great discretion in determining who should be
permitted to testify as an expert and his judgment will not be
disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.
453
In Soileau v. Louisiana Department of Transportation, the
appellate court held that the trial court did not err in permitting an
expert in traffic engineering to state whether or not he agreed with
the legal opinion of another expert and to give his opinion as to
whether the American Association of State Highways and
Transportation Officials ("AASHTO") guidelines applied to a
448. 582 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 586 So. 2d 567 (La.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).
449. Id. at 1386.
450. 459 So. 2d 1299, 1312 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 463 So. 2d
600 (La. 1985).
451. 813 So. 2d 467, 475 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 818 So. 2d 769
(La.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1072 (2002).




bridge.454 The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing testimony in this area.455
In the case of In re Theresa D. Steckler Trust, the trial court,
relying on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 192456 and
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 706, appointed William
Neilson as an expert to advise the court as to the tax status of a
trust (and sub-trusts) and to negotiate with the Internal Revenue
Service on behalf of the trust.458 The appellate court held that the
trial court did not err in the first part of the appointment, but
exceeded its authority in the second (negotiating with the IRS). 459
It appears that determining the tax status of a trust would involve
legal issues.
In Wyble v. Allstate Insurance Co., the court held there was no
error in permitting an adjuster to be questioned as to her
appreciation of the Uninsured Motorist law.4 6°
In Halverson v. Halverson, a Delta Airlines pension plan was
at issue in a partition action.46' For assistance in understanding the
pension plan and how the Sims formula should be applied, the trial
court appointed its own expert, Professor Arruebarrena of Loyola
School of Law.462  Professor Arruebarrena testified at length
concerning Sims, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order, and other legal issues.463 Professor
Arruebarrena also suggested that an exception to the Sims formula
be applied to the facts of the case, which the court did, and which
was affirmed on appeal. 4
64
Too much should not be read into the decision in Boone. The
issue in that case was whether the witness was an expert in the
454. 724 So. 2d 834, 842 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
455. Id.
456. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 192 (2006).
457. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 706 (2005).
458. 678 So. 2d 620, 624-25 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 682 So. 2d 767
(La. 1996).
459. Id. at 625.
460. 581 So. 2d 325, 332 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
461. 589 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 600 So. 2d
655 (La. 1992).
462. Id. at 1155.
463. Id. at 1155-56.
464. Id. at 1155, 1157.
[Vol. 67
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
field of law about which he testified.465 The issue was not whether
his testimony concerning the community or separate classification
of property involved an issue of law and therefore was
inadmissible. 66 The cases cited by the court all involve an expert
witness giving a legal opinion.467 However, the issue in the case,
the classification of the distributions as community or separate, is
not an issue of law, but is an issue of fact.468 The inquiry should
be whether the testimony of the expert witness, opinion or
otherwise, will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a factual issue.469 In a community property partition
action under Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801, this
includes the classification of things and obligations and the
reimbursement claims of the spouses arising out of their
matrimonial regime.47 ° If the trial court feels that such expert
testimony will aid it in its understanding of the evidence being
presented or assist it in correctly resolving a factual issue, i.e.,
classifying things or obligations and determining the existence and
measure of reimbursement that may be due a spouse, then the trial
court should be granted broad discretion in admitting such
testimony into evidence.
XII. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF ASSETS
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered in two cases, Ross v.
Ross47 1 and Lanza v. Lanza,472 the classification of income which
had not been both earned and received during the legal regime.
Both involved renewal commissions received as an agent of State
Farm. In Ross, the policies were issued prior to marriage and the
renewal commissions on these policies were received during the
marriage.4 3 In Lanza, the policies were issued during marriage
465. Boone v. Boone, 899 So. 2d 823, 829 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2005).
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. See cases supra note 443.
469. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 702 (2005).
470. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (2006).
471. 857 So. 2d 384 (La. 2003).
472. 898 So. 2d 280 (La. 2005).
473. 857 So. 2d at 385.
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and the renewal commissions on these policies were received after
the termination of the marriage. 474 In both cases, a legal regime
existed between the spouses.4 75  In Ross, although there was
disagreement both in the court of appeal and supreme court
concerning the treatment of the renewal commissions as civil
fruits, the supreme court held that effort, skill, and industry were
exerted during the community to obtain the renewals and that,
insofar as that effort contributed to the renewal commissions, the
476commissions were community property. Likewise, in Lanza, the
supreme court held that the renewal commissions received after
marriage were community property insofar as they were due to Mr.
Lanza's effort, skill, or industry during the community.
4 77
Although the result was the same in both cases, the burden of proof
was placed on different spouses in the two cases.478  Louisiana
Civil Code article 2340 creates a presumption that things in the
possession of a spouse during the existence of the legal regime are
community property, but provides that either spouse may prove
that they are separate property.479 The burden of proof is, of
course, on the spouse seeking to rebut the presumption and prove
480that a thing is separate property. In Ross, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeal, which had placed the burden of proof
on the wife to prove that substantial labor was expended by Mr.
Ross during the existence of their community in order that the
474. 898 So. 2d at 281-82.
475. Id. at 282, 285; Ross, 857 So. 2d at 389-90.
476. 857 So. 2d at 396-97.
477. 898 So. 2d at 289-90.
478. See id. at 291; Ross, 857 So. 2d at 396-97.
479. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (2006).
480. Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590, 602-03 (La. 2003). The proper
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of community contained in
article 2340 is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 593. This presumption of
community is triggered by possession of a thing during the existence of the legal
regime. Id. at 597. Possession of a thing by a spouse during the community
regime does not classify it as a community thing; it only creates a presumption
that the thing possessed is a community thing. Id. Acquisition of the thing
during the existence of the community is not required to trigger the article 2340
presumption. Id. The acquisition of a thing during the legal regime may result
in its being statutorily classified as community or separate, depending upon the
manner in which it was acquired during the existence of the legal regime. Id.
See Rigby, supra note 123, at 481 for a discussion of this distinction.
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renewal commissions be classified as community.481 The
commissions were received and therefore possessed during the
community and were therefore presumed to be community. 482 In
order to prove that the renewal commissions were his separate
property, the burden of proof was on Mr. Ross to prove that he did
not expend labor during the existence of the community. 483 The
court of appeal relied on Kyson v. Kyson, which made the same
mistake in a case involving rentals from separate property received
during the community. 4
84
On the other hand, in Lanza, the burden of proof was correctly
placed on the wife to prove that the renewal commissions were the
result of Mr. Lanza's efforts during the community. 485 In Lanza,
the renewal commissions were received after the termination of
their community, and, therefore, the community presumption
resulting from possession during the legal regime did not apply.
486
481. Ross, 857 So. 2d at 396.
482. Id. at 397-98.
483. Id. at 396.
484. 596 So. 2d 1308, 1319-20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (on rehearing), writ
denied, 599 So. 2d 314 (La. 1992). In Kyson, income was produced during the
existence of the legal regime from separately owned rental properties of the
husband. Id. at 1309-10. Mr. Kyson executed and filed an article 2339
declaration, reserving as his separate property the civil fruits of his separate
property. Id. at 1309. The rentals were the result of the ownership of the
properties, money spent on repairs, improvements, maintenance, and Mr.
Kyson's labor, involving cleaning, maintenance, painting, hanging a sign, and
meeting prospective renters to show the rental properties. Id. at 1310. On
original hearing, the court held the case to be one in which separate capital was
combined with community labor to produce fruits and remanded the case for a
proration of the rental income. Id. at 1312. On rehearing, the court held that it
was unable to discern from the record sufficient quantification of Mr. Kyson's
time and labor associated with the disputed rental income from which it could
draw any conclusion as to how much of the rental income as the result of his
labor. Id. at 1323. The court did not address the presumption and burden of
proof under article 2340, but effectively placed on Mrs. Kyson the burden of
demonstrating how much of the rental income was the result of her husband's
labor and industry during the legal regime. See id. The case was correctly
criticized by Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 19, at § 3.8, at 66.
485. Lanza v. Lanza, 898 So. 2d 280, 290 (La. 2005).
486. Id.
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XIII. CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS
In Sequeira v. Sequeira, the community was terminated
effective August 8, 2000, by a judgment rendered October 12,
2000.4 87  At issue was the classification of several obligations
incurred by the husband shortly prior to the filing of the divorce
suit by the wife on August 8, 2000.488 The first was a credit card
charge of $3,600.00 on July 25, 2000, for LASIK eye surgery.489
The court held that the debt was not proved to be a community
obligation because the husband failed to prove that the cost of the
surgery was incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of
the marriage,490 citing Krielow v. Krielow.49 1 In Krielow, the
supreme court correctly used the ordinary and customary expense
language, but used it in determining whether a spouse could obtain
reimbursement for separate funds used to pay community
obligations in excess of the other spouse's net share of the
community under Louisiana Civil Code article 2365.492 The
supreme court in Krielow did not use this test for the classification
of an obligation.493 The issue in Krielow was the extent to which
the wife could obtain reimbursement for the payment of
community obligations with her separate funds, not the
classification of the obligations she satisfied with her separate
funds.494 Ordinarily, a spouse seeking reimbursement for separate
funds used to satisfy a community obligation or used for the
acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of community property is
limited to the value of the other spouse's share in the community
after deduction of all community obligations, i.e., the net value of
his one-half interest in the community. 495 There is an exception to
this limitation. If separate property has been used to satisfy a
487. 888 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004), writ denied, 901 So. 2d
1065 (La. 2005).
488. Id. at 1100--01.
489. Id. at ll01.
490. Id. at 1102.
491. 635 So. 2d 180 (La. 1994).
492. Id. at 186-87. See also Sherrod v. Sherrod, 709 So. 2d 352, 356 (La.
App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 720 So. 2d 687 (La. 1998).
493. See Krielow, 635 So. 2d at 187.
494. Id. at 182.
495. LA Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2365, 2367 (2006).
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community obligation which was incurred for the ordinary and
customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support,
maintenance, and education of children of either spouse in keeping
with the economic condition of the community, the spouse
satisfying the community obligation incurred for one or more of
these purposes with separate funds is entitled to reimbursement
from the other spouse regardless of the value of the other spouse's
share of the community.496 However, this is not the test for
classifying the obligation as community or separate. The test for
classifying an obligation as community or separate is whether the
obligation was incurred for the common interest of the spouses or
for the interest of the non-incurring spouse, or only for the interest
of the incurring spouse.
4 97
Second, the court erred in placing the burden of proof on the
husband to prove that the obligation incurred for the LASIK
surgery was a community obligation.498  The obligation was
-incurred during the existence of the legal regime and thus is
presumed to be a community obligation.499  The wife filed her
496. Id.
497. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2360, 2363 (2006). There are several special
classification rules not falling within these general definitional articles. They
include an alimentary obligation imposed by law on a spouse and an obligation
for attorney's fees and costs in an action for divorce incurred before the date of
the judgment of divorce that terminates the community property regime, both of
which are classified as community obligations. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts.
2362, 2362.1 (2006). Also, in the second paragraph of article 2363, two specific
types of obligations are classified as separate obligations. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2363 (2006). An obligation resulting from an intentional wrong not
perpetrated for the benefit of the community and an obligation incurred for the
separate property of a spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the
community, the family, or the other spouse are classified as separate obligations.
Id.
498. See Sequeira v. Sequeira, 888 So. 2d 1097, 1102 (La. App. 5th Cir.
2004), writ denied, 901 So. 2d 1065 (La. 2005).
499. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2361 (2006). The opinion in Sequeira reveals
that the spouses physically separated on July 29, 2000, after the date of the
credit card charge for the LASIK surgery. 888 So. 2d at 1102. However,
whether or not they were physically separated is of no consequence in the
classification of the obligation.
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divorce suit eight days later, on August 8, 2000.500 The burden of
proof was on the wife to prove it was a separate obligation.
5 0
'
The husband also claimed a $2,500.00 cash advance from his
credit card on July 31, 2000, as a community obligation.50 2 There
was no evidence as to the reason for the advance or the disposition
of the funds that were received. 50 3 The court erred in placing the
burden of proof on the husband to prove that this debt was in the
common interest of the spouses or in the wife's interest.50 4 In the
absence of evidence, the presumption of community prevails. 5
500. Sequeira, 888 So. 2d at 1100.
501. See Sims v. Sims, 677 So. 2d 663, 665 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996). Still
undecided is whether the spouse seeking to rebut this presumption must do so by
satisfying the "clear and convincing evidence" test previously required. See In
re Succession of Moss, 769 So. 2d 614, 618 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 776
So. 2d 462 (La. 2000).
In Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590, 600 (La. 2003), the supreme court
abrogated the jurisprudence holding that this elevated standard of proof was
necessary to overcome the presumption in article 2340 that things in the
possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of community of acquets
and gains are community. The supreme court held that the proper standard was
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The legislature has not established any
greater burden to overcome the presumption contained in article 2361.
Therefore, the article 2361 presumption should be rebuttable by either spouse
upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the obligation incurred
during the existence of the community regime is a separate obligation.
In Sequeira, the fifth circuit stated that the supreme court in Krielow held that
the burden of proof on the party claiming reimbursement is to show by a
preponderance of the evidence the nature of the indebtedness. 888 So. 2d at
1101. However, in Krielow, the obligations were community obligations and
the referenced language related to the issue of whether or not these community
obligations were incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the
marriage. 635 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1994). The burden of proof to establish that
the obligations were separate obligations was not at issue in Krielow.
502. Sequeira, 888 So. 2d at 1102.
503. See id.
504. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2361 (2006). The inclusion of the
introductory clause, "Except as provided in Article 2363," in article 2361 is
unfortunate and is misleading. See id. Read literally, it creates for all separate
obligations an exception to the presumption that all obligations incurred during
the existence of a community property regime are community obligations. See
id. Therefore, the presumption of community classification applies only to those
obligations classified as community obligations. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
2360, 2362, 2362.1 (2006). The analysis should be similar to that used in
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The court also held that, in order to determine whether the
funds benefited the community or were for the common interest of
the spouses, it is necessary to examine the uses to which they were
put. Unfortunately, this language appears frequently in the
jurisprudence discussing the classification of obligations.507 An
obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a
community property regime for the common interest of the spouses
or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation.
50 8
A separate obligation is, in part, one that is incurred during the
existence of a community property regime though not for the
common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other
spouse. 509 The intent or purpose in the incurring of the obligation
must necessarily have been formulated and must have existed at
the time the obligation is incurred. If the obligation is the result of
borrowed money, looking to the uses to which the borrowed funds
were put may be useful evidence in determining the true intent of
the obligor spouse in the incurring of the obligation, but it may not
be controlling.510 If a husband borrows money from a bank to pay
for a vacation for his wife and himself, but is robbed of the
borrowed money on his way home, his intent in incurring the
classifying assets. See Rigby, supra note 123, at 478-84. See also Rigby, supra
note 123, at 500 n. 195, for a criticism of this dichotomy reflected in article 2361.
Proof that an obligation incurred during the community regime is one of the
types of obligations listed in article 2363 rebuts the community presumption
created in article 2361; it is not an exception to the presumption.
505. Sims, 677 So. 2d at 665.
506. Sequeira, 888 So. 2d at 1101.
507. For other cases holding that, in cases of borrowed money, in order to
determine whether the obligation benefitted the community or was used for the
common interest of the spouses, it is necessary to examine the uses to which the
borrowed money was put, see Keene v. Reggie, 701 So. 2d 720, 724-25 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1997), McConathy v. McConathy, 632 So. 2d 1200, 1204-05 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1052 (La. 1994), Ledet v. Ledet, 496
So. 2d 381, 383-84 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), Webb v. Pioneer Bank & Trust
Co., 530 So. 2d 115, 118 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988). See also Rigby, supra note
123, at 496, for a criticism of this reasoning.
508. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2360 (2006).
509. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (2006).
510. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 507.
2006]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
obligation, not the result of it, should be controlling in the
classification of the obligation.
It is evident that the statutory test for the classification of an
obligation depends upon the reason or purpose for which it is
incurred, and that reason or purpose relates to the interest or
benefit of people, the spouses or one spouse, and not property.5 II
Statements concerning an obligation benefiting the community
contain conceptual errors. A matrimonial regime is a system of
principles and rules governing the ownership and management of
the property of married persons as between themselves and toward
third persons. 12 One of these systems of rules is the legal regime
of community of acquets and gains. 513 It is not a juridical person
or legal entity. 514 It is a particular system of rules governing the
ownership and management of the property of married persons. A
fortiori, an obligation, or the incurring of it, cannot benefit this
system of rules. Even if the word "community" is used to mean
community property or a patrimonial mass,515 the classification of
an obligation is not determined by whether the obligation is in the
interest of or for the benefit of property, but persons. Many
obligations incurred by spouses do not relate to or affect property
511. Sequeira equates the benefit to the community and the common interest
of the spouses: "To determine whether funds benefitted the community, or were
used for the 'common interest of the spouses,' it is necessary to examine the
uses to which they were put." 888 So. 2d at 1101:
512. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325 (2006).
513. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2326, 2327 (2006).
514. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (c) (2006); Bridges v. Bridges, 692
So. 2d 1186, 1193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
515. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (c) (2006) ("The community of
acquets and gains is not a legal entity but a patrimonial mass, that is, a
universality of assets and liabilities."). This comment is difficult to reconcile
with the statutory definition in article 2325 of a matrimonial regime (of which
the community of acquets and gains is one permissible regime) as a system of
principles and rules governing the ownership and management of the property of
married persons as between themselves and third persons. See LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2325 (2006). It is clear from the logical sequence of the definitional
articles, that the legal regime of community of acquets and gains is not either a
mass of property and obligations or individual items of property, but is a
particular system of rules governing ownership and management of the property
of married persons. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2325-27 (2006). For a
discussion of a possible source of this error, see infra Part XV.
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in any way. Food, a night out, a dinner at a cafd, a cruise, a trip or
other recreation charged to a credit card are examples of such
obligations. Other obligations may involve property, but do not
benefit community property. If a husband buys his wife an
anniversary present, charges it on his credit card, and gives the
present to his wife (a donation), the thing purchased and donated as
a present is her separate property, but the obligation is
community.5 17  The community, whether the word is used to
denote community property, a patrimonial mass, or a particular
system of principles and rules governing the ownership and
management of the property of this married couple, has not been
benefited in any way from the obligation. The wife has benefited,
and perhaps also the husband, but not the community.
A correct analysis of an obligation incurred during the
existence of the community regime is reflected in McGee v.
McGee.518 The husband owned land as his separate property. 19
The parties borrowed money to construct a house on the land,
which was used as the family home.5 20 In the partition, the trial
court decreed that the land and all improvements were the separate
property of the husband.5 2 1 At issue was the classification of the
loan obligation.5 22 The court correctly analyzed the obligation in
terms of the benefit to the spouses. 523 The obligation was incurred
to construct a home in which the spouses lived during their
marriage.524 The court held that the obligation was incurred for the
common interest of the spouses and therefore was a community
obligation.5 25  The result might have been different had the
classification issue been determined by whether or not the
516. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (2006) (defining separate property, in
part, as property acquired by a spouse by donation to him individually).
517. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2361 (2006). The obligation incurred by the
husband to purchase the anniversary present was for the interest of his wife, and,
arguably, in their common interest.





523. Id. at 302.
524. Id. at 301.
525. Id. at 302.
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community or the community property had benefited from the
incurring of the obligation. Seemingly, neither the community nor
community property benefited from incurring the obligation; the
husband's separate property benefited and so did the spouses.
526
The benefiting of separate property by the use of community
money was resolved by the recognition of the reimbursement claim
of the wife under Louisiana Civil Code article 2366, not in the
classification of the obligation.527
XIV. LIABILITY OF SPOUSES FOR COMMUNITY AND SEPARATE
OBLIGATIONS
In a previous law review article, the writer critiqued the cases
erroneously holding that a spouse is personally liable to the
creditor for a community obligation incurred by the other spouse,
but not for a separate obligation incurred, by the other spouse.
528
This misunderstanding still persists. In Finance One of Houma,
L.L.C. v. Barton, the wife, on two occasions, borrowed money
from a finance company, executing promissory notes to evidence
the obligations created by the loans.529 She used the proceeds of
the loan to play video poker.530  She filed bankruptcy
proceedings.531  The finance company sued the husband,
contending that the obligations were community obligations
because of the representations the wife made at the time of the
loans concerning the purpose of the loans.5 32  The husband
contended that he was not liable to the finance company because
the obligations were the separate obligations of the wife, not
community obligations.5 33 The case was tried on the issue of the
classification of the debts.534 The trial court held them to be
separate debts because "the monies obtained by Barbara C. Barton
526. See id. at 302.
527. See id. at 302-03.
528. Rigby, supra note 123, at 487-97.








did not benefit or enrich the community," and dismissed the suit
against Mr. Barton.5 35  The finance company appealed, claiming
that the debts were community obligations and that the husband
was liable to it for the amount owed.536 The court of appeal
correctly held that whether the debts were community or separate
is not determinative of the personal liability of the non-incurring
spouse for the obligation.517  The non-incurring spouse is not
personally liable either during the existence of the legal regime or
after its termination for a debt incurred by the other spouse
irrespective of whether the obligation is classified as community or
separate. 538  The non-incurring spouse may incur or assume
liability for an obligation incurred by the other spouse in the
manner provided by the second and third paragraphs of Louisiana
Civil Code article 2357.539  The appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of the suit against the husband not because the obligation
incurred by his wife was her separate obligation, but because he
was not liable for it whether it was a community or a separate
obligation. 540 The Civil Code articles regulating the satisfaction of
obligations both during the legal regime 41 and after its
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 741. The court cited Rigby, supra note 123, at 465, and the cases
of Tri-State Bank & Trust v. Moore, 609 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992),
and Lawson v. Lawson, 535 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
538. Finance One, 769 So. 2d at 741-42.
539. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (2006). It should be noted that in
each of these instances the law imposes liability on the non-incurring spouse
because of the voluntary act of that spouse occurring subsequent to the
termination of the community regime. See id.
One other situation in which post-termination liability is imposed on the non-
incurring spouse is a provision in Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2801A
regulating the partition of community property and the settlement of the claims
of the spouses arising from a matrimonial regime. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9:2801A(4)(c) (2006).
The liability created by this provision is the obligation to the other spouse to
extinguish the allocated obligation; the provision does not create any liability to
the creditor. See id. Of course, if the spouse to whom the obligation is allocated
incurred the obligation, that spouse is already personally liable to the creditor,
and that liability is not affected by the allocation.
540. Finance One, 769 So. 2d at 742.
541. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2006).
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termination5 42 do not impose personal liability on a spouse for a
community or separate obligation incurred by the other spouse;
they simply identify the property available to a creditor for the
satisfaction of an obligation which was incurred before or during
the community property regime. 
543
Although the classification of an obligation as community or
separate does not determine the rights of the creditor, the
classification of an obligation has four important functions in the
partition of community property and the settlement of claims
arising from a matrimonial regime.544
XV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
There appear to be two competing concepts as to the nature of
the legal regime of community of acquets and gains in the articles
governing that regime and the comments to those articles.
545
The definitional articles clearly classify that regime as one of
several systems of principles and rules governing the ownership
and management of the property of married persons.5 46 The legal
regime is a particular set of rules having this function. 547 On the
542. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (2006).
543. Rigby, supra note 123, at 493.
544. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 19, at § 7.2, at 367, outlines these results
of classifying an obligation as community or separate:
Although the character of an obligation as separate or community is
immaterial during the existence of the community regime, at
termination of the regime the classification of an obligation becomes
important for four reasons: (1) the satisfaction of a community
obligation with former community property or its proceeds is a defense
to personal liability imposed upon the spouse who alienates former
community property; (2) the assumption of responsibility is of one-half
of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse, and
separate creditors of the other spouse are thereafter precluded from
seeking satisfaction from property of the assuming spouse; (3) the
determination of reimbursement rights of the spouses; and (4) if there is
a judicial partition, only community obligations may be allocated to a
spouse and the allocation imposes a personal obligation upon the
spouse to discharge it. These conclusions now appear in the official
comment to the 1990 amendment to La. Civ. Code article 2363.
545. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2334-69 (2006).




other hand, several articles 548 and a comment549 treat the
community as a patrimonial mass of assets and liabilities, an
assemblage of things and obligations. These differing treatments
of the nature of the community may have contributed to some of
the analytical errors previously discussed that appear in the.
jurisprudence, especially in the classification of obligations
incurred during the existence of the legal regime. 550 As previously
noted, the Civil Code classification of an obligation incurred
during the existence of the legal regime depends upon whether it
was incurred for the common interest of the spouses, the interest of
the other spouse, or only for the interest of the incurring spouse.
551
On the other hand, the jurisprudential inquiry is often whether or
not the obligation benefited the community. 552 This benefiting the
community language is used twice in the second paragraph of Civil
Code article 2363 defining certain types of obligations-as separate
obligations of a spouse. 553 It also appears in article 2364.1, which
contains one of the reimbursement rules.5 5 4 Additionally, articles
2336 and 2337 apparently make a distinction between the
community as an assemblage of things and obligations and
particular community things in their proscription against judicial
partition of the community or things of the community5 55 and
against disposition of a spouse's undivided interest in the
community and in particular things of the community556 prior to
the termination of the legal regime.
Article 2338 classifies as community property "damages
awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the
community 557 and article 2343 refers to "a thing forming part of
the community."
558
548. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2336-38, 2343-44, 2357, 2363-65 (2006).
549. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 cmt. (c) (2006).
550. See discussion cited supra notes 497-527.
551. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2360, 2363 (2006).
552. Sequeira v. Sequeira, 888 So. 2d 1097, 1101 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004),
writ denied, 901 So. 2d 1065 (La. 2005). See also cases cited supra note 507.
553. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (2006).
554. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2364.1 (2006).
555. LA. CtV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2006).
556. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2337 (2006).
557. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2006).
558. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2343 (2006).
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The use of the word "community" in these articles and in the
comments thereto define the community in terms of property, not
as a system of principles and rules. In other articles, the words
"property," "separate property," "community property," "thing," or
"things" are correctly used to designate the property owned by the
spouses either as community property or as separate property.
A historical review might be helpful in understanding a
possible source of this confusing use of one word to mean several
different things in the same statute.
Planiol's Traitg El9mentaire de Droit Civil explains that in the
French Civil Code the word community has two meanings:
902. The Double Meaning of the Term
The term "community" designates two different concepts:
(1) The Spouses Themselves, Considered as Partners.
When we say that the community is a creditor or debtor, we
mean that this role is played by the two spouses as one
person.
(2) The Common Property. We say, for instance, that a
creditor has an action against the community, if the
common property of the spouses has been pledged to
him.55
9
If the first meaning of the word "community" in Planiol is used
to refer to the spouses, it is consistent with the definitions of
community obligations and separate obligations in article 2360 and
the first paragraph of article 2363, which define the classification
of obligations in terms of the interest of a spouse or spouses.
5 60
This meaning of the word is also consistent with the words "for the
benefit of the community" in article 2364.1561 and in the first
559. Marcel Planiol, 3 TREATISE ON THE CtViL LAW 83 (La. State Law Inst.
trans., lIth ed. 1959) (1938).
560. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2360, 2363 (2006).
561. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2364.1 (2006). The context of the article
supplies no clue as to whether "a criminal act committed by a spouse, which act
was not perpetrated for the benefit of the community" refers to an act that does
not benefit the spouses or to an act that does not benefit their community
property. Id. It cannot logically refer to a system of principles and rules. See




clause of the second paragraph of article 2363, if these
provisions actually refer to a benefit (or lack of it) to the spouses,
not to community property. It also could be used in the second
clause of the second paragraph of article 2363563 to mean "the
spouses," the family; or the other spouse, if this is the intended
meaning of the text. However, the second meaning of the word
"community," i.e., common property, could just as logically be
used in these articles. 564  However, the use of the word
"community" in the second paragraph of article 2363 and in article
2364.1 to alternatively mean "the spouses" or to mean their
"common property" completely changes both the meaning of these
rules, and, in many cases, the classification of the obligation. In
each instance, does the phrase "benefit [of] the community" mean
benefit to the spouses or benefit to their common property? The
need for clarity suggests that the legislative intent be clarified.
The use of the word "community" in articles 2336, 2337, 2343,
2343.1, 2344, 2357, and 2365 necessarily is an application of the
second meaning of that word in Planiol, as it cannot mean the
spouses in the contexts in which the word is used. It is clear to the
writer that when the jurisprudence uses the phrase "benefit the
community," it is referring to community property. However, it is
not clear whether the word is being used to describe a benefit to a
562. This clause reads, "An obligation resulting from an intentional wrong
not perpetrated for the benefit of the community.... ." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2363 (2006). This is a provision which is parallel to that of article 2364.1. Like
that article, the phrase "for the benefit of the community" could refer either to an
intentional tort committed in defense of the persons of the spouses or their
community property. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2363, 2364.1 (2006). It
cannot logically refer to a system of principles and rules.
563. The clause reads, in part, "[A]n obligation incurred for the separate
property of a spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the community, the
family, or the other spouse, is likewise a separate obligation." LA. Cfv. CODE
ANN. art. 2363 (2006).
564. The use of the word "community" in the second paragraph of article
2363 to mean "the spouses" is more consistent with the definition of a
community obligation in article 2360, as it excludes the spouses, the family, and
the other spouse. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2360 (2006). The use of the
word "community" to mean "community property" does not conform to the
definitions of community and separate obligations in articles 2360 and 2363.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 'arts. 2360, 2363 (2006). It excludes community
property, the family, and the other spouse, but not both spouses.
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universality of assets and obligations, a particular item of
community property, -or all of the community property of the
spouses.
The comment describing the community of acquets and gains
as a universality of assets and liabilities more aptly describes a
universal community under French law,565 which may be
established by agreement of the spouses as an alternative to the
legal regime. It consists, with a few exceptions, of all of the
property, both real and personal, present and to come, and all of
567the debts of the spouses, present and future. In Louisiana, a
community is none of these, but is one regime, or system of
principles and rules, governing the ownership and management of
the property of married persons.
568
In addition to other needed amendments to the articles
governing matrimonial regimes to correct or eliminate other
jurisprudential errors discussed earlier, the use of one word,
"community," to mean several things in the same statute should be
discontinued. Appropriate language should be substituted to
clearly indicate whether each article has as its object a system of
rules, the spouses, an assemblage of assets and obligations, or
property that is classified as community property. This would be a
service to the bench and bar and should eliminate some of the
confusion. Additionally, the comments reflecting this dual use of
the word "community" should be changed for the same reason.
When an article deals with community property, those words
should be used. When an article deals with the spouses, that word
should be used. When an article deals with the system of rules
known as the legal regime, those words should be used.
In the drafting of a civilian code, words must be chosen
carefully and precise language should be used to avoid the problem
565. Planiol, supra note 559, at 77, 86.
566. Id. at 133.
567. Id. See Katherine S. Spaht, LOuISIANA MATRIMONIAL REGIMES CASES
& MATERIALS 474 (La. State Univ. Publications Inst. 2005) for a translation of
article 1497 of the French Civil Code, which permits the spouses to agree that
there will be a universal community between them, and article 1526, which
defines a universal community.
568. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2325, 2327 (2006).
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of defective texts. 569 The use of words having the same sense
throughout the Code is desirable. Although the Louisiana Civil
Code acknowledges that the language of a law may be
ambiguous 570 and may be susceptible of different meanings, 5 and
provides for those contingencies, the goal should be language
which is clear and unambiguous and which can be applied literally
without absurd consequences. 572 The articles of the Civil Code
governing matrimonial regimes should be reviewed and revised
with this goal in mind.
Nor is the problem just imprecision in the use of language.
The Matrimonial Regimes Act should have conceptual consistency
throughout. The articles and comments reflect an inconsistency in
the nature of the legal regime of community of acquets and gains.
If its codal definition as a particular system of principles and rules
governing the ownership and management of the property of
married persons is accepted as the true nature of that regime, it
should be reflected in all the codal articles and comments.
569. Clarence J. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and
Legal Methodfor State and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REv. 351, 390 (1943).
570. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 12 (2006).
571. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006).
572. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
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